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INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is a non-judicial process created by contract between the par-
ties. The parties pretty much determine the rules of the game. Generally, the
arbitrator is empowered only with the authority granted to him by that con-
tract. The Federal Arbitration Act' ("FAA") of 1925 was created to ensure
enforceability of agreements to arbitrate. The FAA is the centerpiece of the
federal arbitration policy as construed by the Supreme Court.
Section 10(a) FAA enumerates grounds on which an arbitral award can
be set aside. The central issue discussed herein is whether parties can agree
by contract to allow one of the parties to initiate review of the arbitral award
by a court that would otherwise have jurisdiction over those parties, or
whether the court's powers are somehow limited to the grounds for vacatur
enumerated in Section 10(a) FAA.
Put more succinctly, this article analyzes the legitimacy of judicial re-
view of an arbitral award on the basis of a pre-dispute agreement providing
that the arbitrator's findings of fact and/or conclusions of law (as set forth in
such award) may be subjected to judicial review, and how such judicial re-
view interacts with §10(a) of the Federal Arbitration Act. The principal focus
of this article is on domestic and international commercial arbitration, al-
though I briefly address certain implications for consumer arbitration.2
Whether to allow parties to agree to subject their arbitral award to judi-
cial review has been the subject of a number of recent federal and state court
cases. Some courts hold that this practice is not valid because private parties
cannot determine by contract how federal courts review arbitration awards.3
Other courts, constituting the majority, hold that parties' contractual freedom
1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1998).
2. See infra notes 268-273 and accompanying text.
3. Circuits include the 7
th, 8th, and 101h.
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allows them to enable either party to appeal the arbitral award to the federal
court having jurisdiction over the parties.4 The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to
rule on the issue.
There exists a clear tension concerning the finality of arbitral awards. On
the one hand, one of the principal benefits of arbitration is, or at least used to
be, that generally the award is final and binding upon the parties. Arbitration
can thus be a relatively quick and efficient way to resolve a dispute. On the
other hand, as arbitrators are asked to interpret more complex legal issues,
that same finality is increasingly felt as the absence of much needed quality
control over arbitrators.5 This tension is heightened by the fact that the fed-
eral Circuits are split on the question of whether a pre-dispute agreement ena-
bling one of the parties to appeal the arbitral award to the appropriate federal
court is valid and enforceable.
Part I of this article discusses the leading case holding that a pre-dispute
agreement enabling appeal from an arbitral award is invalid, the Tenth Circuit
case Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., and the other cases holding the same
way. Part II discusses the leading case upholding the validity of an agreement
enabling appeal from an arbitral award, the Ninth Circuit case LaPine Tech.
Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., and the other cases that hold the same view.
Not unexpectedly, this topic has been the subject of a substantial number
of scholarly articles and comments. Part III analyzes the principal issues
raised by both the case law and by some of the commentators' observations.
These issues include the contractual nature of arbitration agreements, a fed-
eral court's jurisdiction to expand judicial review, and the public policy favor-
ing arbitration.
All cases and commentators seem to frame the specific question at issue
as one of whether parties can contractually "expand" judicial review beyond
the limited statutory grounds of §10(a) of the FAA and (most of the time) be-
yond certain judicially created non-statutory grounds. Part IV introduces the
concept that the issue can be reframed, because there is a fundamental differ-
ence between arbitral appeal as contracted for between the parties and the
statutory (and non-statutory) grounds for vacatur, i.e. to set aside and annul
an award.
Part V explores the case for arbitral appeal as a policy decision. Follow-
ing LaPine, but based on a different analysis as a matter of public policy, it
4. Circuits include the 51h and 9th
.
5. Accord, Ian R. Macneil, American Arbitration Law, Reformation - Nationalization - In-
ternationalization 175 (New York 1992) (" . . . tension is inevitable between the freedom of ar-
bitrators to make final decisions and the need for judicial oversight when decisions concern im-
portant regulatory legislation").
4
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is desirable to empower the contracting parties with the choice to provide for
arbitral appeal into their agreements, including international commercial arbi-
tration agreements, and even if, as this author believes, that choice may not
be a wise one most of the time. The various policy considerations and practi-
cal reasons to allow arbitral appeal are then discussed. Part VI deals with the
issue of arbitral appeal in international commercial arbitration.
Part VII tackles some of the ramifications of making a distinction be-
tween arbitral appeal and vacatur This distinction allows for an independent
analysis of the character of the statutory vacatur grounds and the desirability
of non-statutory grounds to set aside awards. An analysis that is not forced to
choose for, or against, non-statutory vacatur grounds based on one's opinion
as to whether or not parties ought to be able to provide in their contracts for
the possibility to submit their arbitral award to judicial review. Such analysis
leads this author to conclude that the statutory vacatur grounds for setting
aside awards ought to be recognized as mandatory and non-waivable. This ar-
ticle urges the United States Supreme Court to rule that the grounds for vaca-
tur are limited to those enumerated in § 10(a) FAA, thus doing away with the
non-statutory vacatur grounds developed by the lower courts.6
Part VIII discusses what a system would look like that recognizes the
possibility of pre-dispute agreements allowing arbitral appeal combined with
mandatory statutory vacatur grounds with the losing party no-longer having
non-statutory grounds available to challenge the award. The tension between
"finality as a benefit" and "finality as a lack of quality control" may be re-
solved if the Supreme Court adopts a clear policy permitting arbitral appeal if
the parties have expressly provided for it in their agreement, while at the
same time limiting the grounds for vacatur to those enumerated in § 10(a)
FAA. That policy would close the "back door" that now causes unnecessary
delays the finality of the award, which parties bargained for when they did
not expressly agreed beforehand to submit to the possibility of appeal. Part
IX makes a few closing observations about the future of the law in this area.
6. The United States Supreme Court has yet to consider the question of whether the sys-
tem created by the FAA allows for judicially created, non-statutory grounds to set aside an arbi-
tral award that would be in addition to the grounds for vacatur enumerated in §10(a) FAA. But
see infra note 270.
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I. CASES REJECTING THE VALIDITY OF PRE-DISPUTE AGREEMENTS ALLOWING
JUDICIAL REVIEW
The leading cases dealing with the issue of whether to permit parties to
a pre-dispute agreement to validly include a provision that allows either party
to appeal the arbitral award to the appropriate federal court are the Tenth Cir-
cuit decision in Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co.7 and the Ninth Circuit decision
in LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp.8 Part I of this article discusses
Bowen and the other cases that hold that such a clause is invalid. Part II dis-
cusses LaPine and the other cases that hold that such a clause is valid.
A. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co. (10h Circuit, 2001)
On June 20, 2001, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered its deci-
sion in Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co. holding that parties may not contract
for "expanded judicial review" of arbitration awards.9 In doing so, the Tenth
Circuit followed the dictum of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the
1991 case of Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times,
Inc. (hereinafter "CTU"). 0
Ernest and Mary Bowen sued the Amoco Pipeline Company in the Dis-
trict Court of Eastern Oklahoma seeking damages from the contamination of
a creek on their property. Amoco moved to compel the matter to arbitration
pursuant to a clause contained in a 1918 right-of-way agreement (ratified in
1943) between both parties' predecessors in interest. Subsequent to the court's
decision to compel arbitration, the parties agreed to use the CPR Rules for
Non-Administered Arbitration of Business Disputes," but they had also previ-
ously agreed to a right of appeal to the district court "on the grounds that the
award is not supported by the evidence."' 2 After a panel of three arbitrators
had found in favor of the Bowens, Amoco filed a notice of appeal based on
this clause, while the Bowens sought confirmation of the award in the district
court. The district court refused to review the award beyond the grounds for
vacatur provided for in § 10(a) of the FAA 3 and confirmed the award in
7. 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001).
8. 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997).
9. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 937
10. 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991).
11. The CPR Rules for Non-Administered Arbitration of Business Disputes can be found
at the website of the Center for Public Resources at, www.cpradr.org/arb-rules.htm (last vistited
February 11, 2003).
12. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 930 (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. Section 10(a) of the Federal Arbitration Act provides in pertinent part:
In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the
6
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favor of the Bowens. Amoco appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
Disagreeing with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits 4 (and recognizing the un-
published decision of the Fourth Circuit going the same way"), the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision and held that no legal authority al-
lows contracting parties to determine how federal courts review arbitration
awards. "To the contrary," Chief Judge Deanell R. Tacha opined, "through
the FAA Congress has provided explicit guidance regarding judicial standards
of review of arbitration awards ...The decisions directing courts to honor
parties' agreements and to resolve close questions in favor of arbitration sim-
ply do not dictate that courts submit to varying standards of review imposed
by private contract."' 16 Judge Tacha went on to say:
The FAA's limited review ensures judicial respect for the arbitration process and prevents
courts from enforcing parties' agreements to arbitrate only to refuse to respect the results
of the arbitration. These limited standards manifest a legislative intent to further the fed-
eral policy favoring arbitration by preserving the independence of the arbitration process.
Unlike § 4 of the FAA, which allows parties to petition a federal court for an order com-
pelling arbitration "in the manner provided for in the agreement," the provisions gov-
erning judicial review of awards, 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-1I, contain no language requiring dis-
trict courts to follow parties' agreements.
Not surprisingly, the FAA's narrow standards reflect the Supreme Court's well-established
view of the relationship between arbitration and judicial review: "[By agreeing to arbi-
trate, a party 'trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration."' Contractually expanded standards,
particularly those that allow for factual review, clearly threaten to undermine the indepen-
dence of the arbitration process and dilute the finality of arbitration awards because, in or-
der for arbitration awards to be effective, courts must not only enforce the agreements to
arbitrate but also enforce the resulting arbitration awards. [citations omitted]"
award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the
arbitration:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing,
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the contro-
versy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mu-
tual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
14. LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997); Gateway Techs.
Inc. v. MCI Telecomms., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995); Hughes Training, Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d
588 (5th Cir. 2001).
15. Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 1997).
16. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934.
17. Id. at 935.
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As a second ground for rejecting the parties' ability to contractually ex-
pand judicial review of arbitral awards, the Tenth Circuit court added, "under
expanded legal or factual standards, the reviewing court would be engaging in
work different from what it would do if it simply heard the case itself." 8 The
court warned that "[p]arties should be aware that they get what they bargain
for and that arbitration is far different from adjudication."' 9
B. Other Cases Prohibiting "Expanded Judicial Review"
Preceding Bowen, there are two cases that appear to follow Judge Pos-
ner's dictum in CTU:20 UHC Management Co. v. Computer Sciences Corp.21
and Crowell v. Downey Cmty. Hosp. Found.22 These two cases are discussed
next.
1. UHC Management (8th Circuit, 1998)
In UHC Management,23 the agreement between the parties did not in-
clude an express provision that the arbitral award would be subject to appeal
by the courts. Computer Sciences had argued that even if federal arbitration
law rather than the Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act applied, "the parties
nonetheless effectively contracted for heightened judicial scrutiny when they
included the provision that arbitrators should be 'bound by controlling
law."'
24
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed doubt as to the ability of
parties to expand judicial review of arbitration awards contractually: "Should
parties desire more scrutiny than the [FAA] authorizes courts to apply, 'they
can contract for an appellate arbitration panel to review the arbitrator's
18. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936 (citation omitted).
19. Bowen 254 F.3d at 935-936.
20. See supra note 9.
21. 148 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1998).
22. 115 Cal.Rptr 2d 810. There is also an earlier decision by the Court of Appeals of
Michigan in a divorce matter, rejecting under Michigan law the parties' arbitration agreement
which allowed for appeal to the Court of Appeals. Dick v. Dick, 210 Mich. App. 576 (1995).
23. 148 F.3d at 997 (8th Cir. 1998). The issue before the Circuit court of appeals was
whether the district court, in light of (i) a choice-of-law clause providing that the agreement is to
be governed by and construed under Minnesota law "to the extent not preempted by ... federal
law" and (ii) the further provision that the arbitrators "shall be bound by controlling law,"
should have applied the Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act (rather than the FAA) in conjunction
with controlling Minnesota common law regarding judicial review of arbitration awards. Id. at
995, 997. The Eighth Circuit court of appeals concluded that the district court properly applied
the FAA, holding that the arbitration agreement did not intend to preclude the application of the
FAA or to expand judicial review of the arbitration award. Id. at 999.
24. Id. at 997.
8
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award[;] they cannot contract for judicial review of that award.' 25
The Eighth Circuit Court stressed, however, that "it is [not] yet a fore-
gone conclusion" that parties are able to agree to ignore provisions of the
FAA. 26 Clearly, the court kept the door open for a future change of mind by
adding:
Assuming that it is possible to contract for expanded judicial review of an arbitration
award, the parties' intent to do so must be clearly and unmistakably expressed. Cf. First
Options, 514 U.S. at 944 (courts should not assume parties intended to arbitrate arbi-
trability unless there is "clear and unmistakable" evidence they did so). In contrast to the
agreements at issue in Lapine and Gateway, the present agreement does not manifest such
an intent."
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court correctly
reviewed the arbitral award under the narrow standards of the Sections 10
and 11 of the FAA.
2. Crowell (CA Court of Appeal, 2d Appellate District, 2002)
Most recently, the Second District Court of Appeal in Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia refused to follow the LaPine doctrine. In Crowell v. Downey Cmty.
Hosp. Found.,2 Dr. Ronald Crowell sought a declaration of rights that the ar-
bitration provision in their agreement for Dr. Crowell to furnish emergency
services to the Hospital was enforceable. The agreement included a detailed
arbitration provision under the California Arbitration Act ("CAA"), 9 which
included a provision that the award of the arbitrator:
shall be final, binding and enforceable upon both Hospital and Contractor as provided in
the arbitration statute, except that upon the petition of any party to the arbitration, a court
shall have the authority to review the transcript of the arbitration proceedings and the ar-
bitrator's award and shall have the authority to vacate the arbitrator's award, in whole or
in part, on the basis that the award is not supported by substantial evidence or is based
upon an error of law.-
The court reviewed the legislative history of the CAA, and noted that
§ 1296 of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly allows judicial review for er-
25. Id. at 998 (quoting LaPine, 130 F.3d at 891 (Mayer, J., dissenting)) .
26. Id.
27. Id. at 998.
28. 115 Cal. Rptr 2d 810.
29. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1282 et seq.
30. 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 812 n. 2.
9
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rors of fact or law in Public Construction Contract Arbitration if the parties
agree that the arbitrator's award must be supported by law and substantial ev-
idence, but not for any other form of arbitration under the Act. The court
concluded that the parties are not able to confer jurisdiction upon this court
where none exists through stipulation.3 1
The court explicitly considered and rejected LaPine32 as a case that was
decided by a sharply divided panel of the Ninth Circuit under the FAA,
which allows broader judicial review of arbitration awards than the CAA (re-
ferring, curiously, not to any statutory provision in the FAA but to the non-
statutory grounds for vacatur developed by case law).33 Interestingly, as a re-
sult of holding that appeal from the arbitral award was not permitted under
the CAA, the court declared the entire arbitration agreement void, and the
case had to be litigated in court.3 4
Neither the court's majority nor the dissent considered the question
whether it should apply federal law rather than state law to determine
whether the contractual provision for arbitral appeal was valid and enforcea-
ble. In Southland Corp. v. Keating,35 the Supreme Court concluded that the
Federal Arbitration Act pre-empts state law; and held that state courts cannot
apply state statutes that invalidate arbitration agreements.36 Arguably, the
Court invalidated an arbitration agreement in Crowell based on its analysis of
California law when it should have followed federal law (and therefore La-
Pine), especially considering that it drew the (logical) conclusion that the pro-
31. Id. at 817 (citing Old Republic Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 53 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 50, 54-55 (1996)).
32. In a probing dissent, Judge Nott showed support for the LaPine doctrine and pointed
out that the two cases on which the majority put its principal reliance both contemplated the pos-
sibility of judicial review of errors of law and/or facts by agreement between the parties, and that
"[t]he shortcoming of the arbitration provision in Old Republic was not that the parties agreed to
greater review of the arbitrator's award than provided in the Act, but that they sought to agree to
the jurisdiction of the appellate court and sidestep the trial court." Id. at 823.
33. Id. at 816.
34. The Crowell Court said: "The provision for judicial review of the merits of the arbitra-
tion award was so central to the arbitration agreement that it could not be severed." Id. at 817.
This result was contrary to the finding of severability by the Federal District Court in LaPine.
See infra note 56. It appears to this author that the result reached by the Crowell court is the cor-
rect one. Absent evidence to the contrary, agreeing to arbitration with the right to appeal the ar-
bitral award to a court is not only central to the arbitration agreement, it would also appear quite
possibly to be a negotiated solution "in-between" agreeing to arbitration and agreeing to have
disputes resolved by the courts. It seems plausible, therefore, that the parties would not have
agreed to arbitration if they had known that the losing party would be prevented from appealing
the award.
35. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
36. Id., at 15-16.
10
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vision allowing for appeal was not severable from the rest of the arbitration
clause and thus invalidated the entire agreement to arbitrate. 37
Following its decision in Southland, the Supreme Court in Allied-Bruce
Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson,3 8 analyzed the significance of Congress'
use of the words "involving commerce" in § 2 of the FAA.39 The Court first
reaffirmed its earlier decisions that the FAA was enacted pursuant to Con-
gress' substantive power to regulate interstate commerce and admiralty4° and
that the FAA was applicable in state courts and pre-emptive of state laws
hostile to arbitration. Relying on these background principles and upon the
evident reach of the words "involving commerce," the Court interpreted § 2
as implementing Congress' intent "to exercise [its] commerce power to the
full."'a As a result, the Court invalidated the Alabama law that, as the only
one in the nation still to do so,42 declared pre-dispute arbitration agreements
to be void as against public policy.
Given the broad interpretation of "involving commerce" in Allied-Bruce
and assuming that the pre-emptive effect of the FAA in Southland extends to
the case law developed under the FAA, Southland and Allied-Bruce could
provide an argument that the question of whether parties can lawfully agree
to the judicial review they desire, needs to be answered under federal rather
than state law, in which case the LaPine ruling would be controlling.
As noted above, the Tenth Circuit expressly disagreed with the holdings
of the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits.43 The leading case holding differently
is the 1997 Ninth Circuit's decision in LaPine, which is discussed next.
II. CASES RECOGNIZING THE VALIDITY OF PRE-DISPUTE AGREEMENTS
ALLOWING JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in LaPine was not the first circuit
court to consider the question of whether to allow parties to a pre-dispute
37. See supra notes 27-34.
38. 513 U.S. 265 (1995)
39. Id., at 273-277
40. ld.(citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405
(1967)(Harlan, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 277.
42. Henry C. Strickland et al., Modem Arbitration for Alabama: A Concept Whose Time
Has Come, 25 CuMa. L. REv. 59, 60-61 (1994 / 1995).
43. See supra notes 14 and 15 and accompanying text.
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agreement to validly include a provision allowing either party to appeal to the
appropriate federal district court. It was preceded by a 1995 decision by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Gateway Techs. Inc. v. MCI Telecomms.,44
and an unpublished 1997 decision by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland.45
A. LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp. (9h Circuit, 1997)
In December 1997, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that parties
to an arbitration agreement could validly agree to include in such an agree-
ment a provision directing the federal District Court with jurisdiction over the
parties to vacate, modify or correct the arbitral award "(i) based upon any of
the grounds referred to in the Federal Arbitration Act, (ii) where the arbitra-
tors' findings of fact are not supported by substanial evidence, or (iii) where
the arbitrators' conclusions of law are erroneous. ' 46 In so doing, the Ninth
Circuit followed a 1984 decision by the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, Fils et Cables d'Acier de Lens v. Midland Metals Corp. '47
and the 1995 Fifth Circuit decision in Gateway Techs. Inc. v. MCI
Telecomms. 48
Between 1984 and 1986, LaPine, Kyocera and Prudential-Bache Trade
Services ("PBTC") had entered into a series of agreements in connection
with a joint venture for the manufacture, marketing, and sale of computer
disk drives. Under these agreements, LaPine, which had developed a 10 MB
hard disk, would market and sell the drives, Kyocera would provide the man-
ufacturing capability, and PBTC would provide the financing for the venture.
When Kyocera refused to comply with one of the agreements, LaPine insti-
tuted proceedings in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California.
Kyocera moved to compel arbitration pursuant to §4 of the FAA 4 9 in ac-
cordance with § 8.10 of the parties' "definitive agreement," which provided
for arbitration under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce ("ICC").50 The district court granted Kyocera's motion.
44. 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
45. 120 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 1997).
46. LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 887 (9th Cir. 1997).
47. 584 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Because of its "advanced age", this case is not dis-
cussed in detail.
48. 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
49. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).
50. ICC Arbitration Rules, Art. 28(6) (1998, 2001). The Rules are available at http://
www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/rules.asp.
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Subsection (d) of § 8.10 of the parties' agreement provided in pertinent
part that:
[t]he arbitrators shall issue a written award which shall state the bases of the award and
include detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Court . . . may enter judg-
ment upon any award, either by confirming the award or by vacating, modifying or cor-
recting the award. The Court shall vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) based upon
any of the grounds referred to in the Federal Arbitration Act, (ii) where the arbitrators'
findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence, or (iii) where the arbitrators'
conclusions of law are erroneous.5
The issues to be decided in arbitration were agreed upon pursuant to Terms
of Reference52 that included a confirmation of the court's authority to vacate,
modify, or correct the arbitral award on these three grounds.5 3
The ensuing ICC arbitration resulted in a $257 million award in favor of
LaPine and PBTC. LaPine and PBTC filed a motion in the District Court to
confirm the award. Not surprisingly, given the large sum of money involved,
Kyocera made a motion to vacate, modify, and correct the arbitral award. The
District Court confirmed the award and denied Kyocera's motion,5 4 holding
that §§ 8.10(d)(ii) and (iii) of the agreement "assume the prerogative of Con-
gress, in that they presume to direct this court as to the substance and param-
eters of its exercise of judicial power."55 Instead, the District Court reasoned
that it had jurisdiction only to consider the grounds for vacatur listed in §10
of the FAA.5 6
51. 130 F.3d at 887.
52. Pursuant to Article 18 of the ICC Rules of Arbitration, the Arbitral Tribunal draws up
so-called Terms of Reference that include, pursuant to subparagraph (d) of Article 18(1), "unless
the Arbitral Tribunal considers it inappropriate, a list of issues to be determined." UAder Article
18(2) of the Rules, the Terms of Reference must be signed by the parties and the Arbitral Tribu-
nal. The Terms of Reference, together with the Procedural Timetable referred to in Article 18(4),
are principally intended as the roadmap for the arbitral proceedings that is agreed to by the
parties.
53. LaPine v. Kyocera Corp., 909 F. Supp. 697, 708-09 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
54. Id. at 709.
55. Id. at 705.
56. Before the District Court could turn to an analysis as to whether any of the grounds
for vacatur set forth in § 10(a) of the FAA applied, it had to address and reject Kyocera's argu-
ment that if the court rejected the possibility of appeal, the entire arbitration clause had to be in-
valid, because "the scope of review clause as included in the Arbitration Agreement is an inte-
gral part of the arbitration provision, and there is no basis to suppose that the parties would have
agreed to arbitrate at all, absent that provision." Id. at 706. The court found that "[miotivations
of the parties in contracting for the defined scope of judicial review are unknown to the court
13
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Kyocera appealed the District Court's decision to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals. Judge Fernandez, writing the majority opinion, framed the appeal
as boiling down to one issue: "Is federal court review of an arbitration agree-
ment necessarily limited to the grounds set forth in the FAA or can the court
apply greater scrutiny, if the parties have so agreed?" 57
Observing that the parties "indisputably contracted for heightened judi-
cial scrutiny" of the arbitrators' award when they agreed that review would
be for errors of fact or law, the Ninth Circuit held that it "must honor that
agreement.""8 Quoting at length from the Supreme Court's decision in Volt
Info. Sciences Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. Of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. ,9 the Ninth
Circuit based its holding on what it felt was the principle behind the federal
policy as embodied in the FAA, which was to guarantee that courts will en-
force private agreements to arbitrate according to their terms.6° Quoting Volt,
and the parties offer nothing but speculative suggestion on this score. The contents of §
8.10(d)(ii) and (iii) of the Definitive Agreement are clearly severable." Id. Interestingly, the Dis-
trict Court did not rely on any severability clause in the contract. Since the Court's finding was
irrelevant on appeal, it was not reviewed. In this author's opinion, the District Court's holding is
questionable because it would seem entirely possible that, given the enormous sums of money in-
volved in the venture, at least one of the parties felt that they had to choose between a court pro-
ceeding (with or without a jury) and arbitration with possibility of appeal, and that if they had
known that the latter would be held to be void they would have chosen for the first option. The
District Court distinguished Graham Oil Co. v. Arco Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994),
(holding that, "[g]enerally, a clause of a contract is not severable where it is an integral part of
an entire contract, that is when the terms of the portion to be severed appear to be interdependent
and common to the remaining terms" by finding, rather tautologically, that the arbitration agree-
ment presented "a clear cleavage in its terms between the arbitration procedure to be conducted
by the arbitrators and the review of the arbitration procedure to be conducted by the court." Id.
For a state court decision holding the opposite view, see Crowell v. Downey Cmty. Hosp. Found.,
115 Cal. Rptr 2d 810 (2002); see also supra note 32 and accompanying text. Perhaps the decid-
ing factor for the LaPine District Court was that (contrary to the status of the proceedings in the
Crowell case) the arbitration had already taken place, and for the Court to accept the view that
the arbitration agreement was void would mean that the whole case would have had to be retried
in the District Court which would have the undesirable result that the losing party, Kyocera,
would have gained much more than it could expect and hope for from the judicial review of the
award that it was actually seeking. It would appear that Professor Andreas Lowenfeld thought
that for that reason the District Court's decision was the correct one. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Can
Arbitration Coexist with Judicial Review? A Critique of LaPine v. Kyocera, 3 ADR CURRENTS 1
(1998). This consequence illustrates the importance of having certainty as to what the law is on
this issue. It is hoped that the Supreme Court will soon get (and take) the opportunity to rule on
the subject of legality of pre-dispute agreements for arbitral appeal. For an extensive discussion
of severability of illegal contract terms under California law (which applied both in LaPine and
Crowell), see Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Serv., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 122-124 (2000).
57. 130 F.3d at 887.
58. Id. at 888.
59. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
60. Lapine, 130 F.3d at 888.
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the court observed that "[a]rbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not
coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agree-
ments as they see fit."'61 As examples of the Supreme Court's application of
these rules, the Ninth Circuit Court pointed to cases in which the Supreme
Court has enforced contract terms that called for (i) rules other than the
FAA, 62 (ii) punitive damages despite contrary state law, 63 and (iii) limiting the
scope of the issues submitted to arbitration. 64
The court also approvingly quoted from the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Gateway: "[a]s [the Fifth Circuit] wisely put it: 'Because these parties con-
tractually agreed to expand judicial review, their contractual provision supple-
ments the FAA's default standard of review and allows for de novo review of
the issues of law embodied in the arbitration award.' "65 It also approvingly
quoted the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that federal arbitration policy demands
that the court conduct its review according to the terms of the arbitration
contract.
66
Quoting from Fils et Cables,67 the Ninth Circuit went on to observe that
even if a court's review of evidence and error of law seems less efficient than
the normal scope of arbitration review, it nevertheless reduces the burden on
that court below the level that would exist in the absence of any provision for
arbitration. 68
Judge Fernandez rejected Judge Posner's dictum in the Seventh Circuit's
decision in CTU that parties may not by contract expand grounds for review
because "federal jurisdiction cannot be created by contract." 69 Quoting the
Supreme Court in Volt, Judge Fernandez emphasized that "[a]rbitration under
the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are generally free to
structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit."70
Judge Posner suggested in CTU that "[i]f the parties want, they can con-
tract for an appellate arbitration panel to review the arbitrator's award. But
61. Lapine, 130 F.3d at 888 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 474)
62. dat 888 (citing Volt, 489 U.S. at 478 (1989)).
63. Id. (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 55 (1995)).
64. Id. (citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995)).
65. Id. at 889 (quoting Gateway, 64 F3d at 997).
66. Id. (quoting Gateway, 64 F.3d at 997).
67. 584 F. Supp. at 244.
68. Lapine, 130 F.3d at 889 (quoting Fils et Cables,584 F.Supp. at 244).
69. Id. at 890 (quoting CTU, 935 F.2d at 1505).
70. Id. at 888 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 478-79).
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they cannot contract for judicial review of that award; federal jurisdiction
cannot be created by contract."'7' The Ninth Circuit found that "[i]f the court
intended to refer to the FAA as a jurisdictional statute, it would have been
negating the established principle that the FAA is a regulation of commerce
rather than a limitation on or conferral of federal court jurisdiction. 72
Remanding the case 73 for review of the decision by the District Court
through use of the standard agreed to by the parties, Judge Fernandez con-
cluded by saying:
When parties are able to scry7 4 the possibility of future disputes, they may allow those to
be resolved through the normal litigation process in court, or they may agree to remove
them from that forum and resort to the use of an arbitral tribunal. When they do the lat-
ter, they may leave in place the limited court review provided by §§ 10 and 11 of the
FAA, or they may agree to remove that insulation and subject the result to a more search-
ing court review of the arbitral tribunal's decision, for example a review for substantial
evidence and errors of law. In short, the FAA is not an apotropaion 75 designed to avert
overburdened court dockets; it is designed to avert interference with the contractual rights
of the parties.
76
In sum, LaPine dictates that courts should enforce private agreements to
arbitrate according to their terms even when those terms provide for judicial
review of the award. The court dismissed the contention of the CTU court
that parties would be expanding federal jurisdiction in situations involving re-
view of arbitral awards.
B. Other Cases Allowing Parties to Agree to "Expanded Judicial Review"
The District Court for Massachusetts in the First Circuit followed LaPine
in New England Utilities v. Hydro-Quebec,77 as did, albeit tentatively, the
71. d.at 890 (quoting CTU, 935 F.3d at 1505).
72. Id. at 890 [citation omitted].
73. On remand, on April 4, 2000, the District Court held that the ICC arbitration panel did
not make any errors of law, saying that the arbitrators' conclusions were "not only sound but
... amply supported by the undisputed facts." ICC Arbitrators' Findings in Kyocera Arbitra-
tion Were 'Legally Sound,' 15 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. No. 5 (May 2000). On May 17, 2001,
the District Court issued an amended judgment, again confirming the arbitral award. As of that
date, LaPine was to recover more than $370 million plus interest from Kyocera, Prudential-Bache
was to recover more than $33 million plus interest, and jointly the companies were to recover an
additional $24 million. On June 21, 2001, the District Court awarded an additional $3 million
plus interest in attorneys' fees. $3 Million in Attorneys' Fees Awarded to LaPine Technology,
Prudential-Bache Trade Services, 16 MEALEY' INT'L ARB. REP. No. 7 (July 2001).
74. This is one of several instances in which Judge Fernandez displays his rich vocabulary.
"Scrying" appears to be some form of divination. See, e.g., www.paganpath.com/scry.html.
75. The word comes from the Greek apotropaios, something that wards off evil.
76. Lapine, 130 E3d at 890-891.
77. 10 E Supp. 2d 53 (D. Mass. 1998). See also Mantle v. Upper Deck Co., 956 F Supp.
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State Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, Inc. v. J.
Stog Tech GmbH.78 In addition, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had occa-
sion to confirm the position it espoused in Gateway in its 2001 decision in
Hughes Training, Inc. v. Cook.79
Before discussing these cases, the Gateway case and the unpublished
Syncor case of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals are worthy of mention.
As it was unpublished, and perhaps also because it preceded LaPine by only
a few months,80 it was not considered in the LaPine opinion.
1. Gateway (5th Circuit, 1995)
In Gateway,8 MCI had successfully bid on a telephone system for the
Virginia Department of Corrections that would enable inmates to place collect
calls to authorized individuals without operator assistance. MCI subcontracted
with Gateway to furnish, install and maintain the necessary equipment and
software for this system. When Gateway's system appeared to be defective,
MCI installed its own automated system to bypass Gateway's defective one
and then sent a default notice to Gateway terminating the contract.
82
Gateway initiated arbitration arguing that MCI had not acted in good
faith and that MCI's decision to migrate from the Gateway system was pri-
marily motivated by profit motives. 83 When the arbitrator found in favor of
Gateway, MCI appealed to the Northern District of Texas to vacate the award
in accordance with the contractual provision that "the arbitration decision
shall be final and binding on both parties, except that errors of law shall be
subject to appeal."84
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (as did the District Court) dealt with
the issue concisely, finding that
719, 726 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (holding that since the parties did not expressly provide for expanded,
judicial review of an arbitration agreement, the court was required to apply the default standard
of review specified in the FAA.)
78. 765 A.2d 1226 (R.I. 2001).
79. 254 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2001).
80. LaPine was decided December 9, 1997, while Syncor was decided on August 11,
1997.
81. Gateway, 64 F.3d 993.
82. Id. at 995-96
83. Id. at 995.
84. Id. at 996.
17
van Ginkel: Reframing the Dilemma of Contractually Expanded Judicial Review:
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2003
[s]uch a contractual modification is acceptable because, as the Supreme Court has empha-
sized, arbitration is a creature of contract and 'the FAA's pro-arbitration policy does not
operate without regard to the wishes of the contracting parties . . . . It does not follow
that the FAA prevents the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate under different rules
than those set forth in the Act itself. Indeed, such a result would be quite inimical to the
FAA's purpose of ensuring that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to
their terms. Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are
generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit. Just as they may
limit by contract the issues which they will arbitrate, so too may they specify by contract
the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted. 5
The Fifth Circuit court concluded that, because the parties contractually
agreed to "expand judicial review," their contractual provision supplemented
the FAA's default standard of review and allowed for a de novo review of the
issues embodied in the arbitration award. 86
2. Syncor (4th Circuit, 1997)
On August 11, 1997, about four months prior to the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in LaPine, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals followed Gateway in an
unpublished opinion, Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland.87 The case involved
Syncor's claim against its former employee, McLeland, alleging that by en-
gaging in competitive activities he had breached his employment agreement
and certain secrecy agreements. The arbitration clause in the employment
agreement provided that the "arbitration decision shall be final and binding
on both parties, except that errors of law shall be subject to appeal." 88
Quoting Gateway and Volt, the Fourth Circuit held that the "contractual
modification" was acceptable, supplementing the FAA's default standard of
review. 89
3. New England Utilities (D.C. Mass., 1998)
The District Court for Massachusetts followed LaPine and Gateway in
New England Utilities v. Hydro-Quebec.90 In this case, New England Utilities
("NEU") filed a state court action to confirm an arbitrator's award concern-
ing the international purchase and transportation of electricity under the Mas-
sachusetts Uniform Arbitration Act. Hydro-Quebec filed a notice of removal
85. Id. (quoting Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 55 (1995)(ci-
tation omitted)(Emphasis in original).
86. Id. at 997.
87. 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21248 (4th Cir. 1997); cert. den. 1998 U.S. LEXIS 898.
88. Id. at 16.
89. Id.
90. 10 F Supp. 2d 53 (D. Mass. 1998).
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to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction and moved to vacate the
award.9
The agreement between the parties provided for arbitration under speci-
fied FAA rules, but provided further that "the decision of the Arbitrator shall
be final and binding on all parties except that any party may petition a court
of competent jurisdiction for review of errors of law." 92
In an entertaining and well-written opinion, Judge Patti B. Saris noted
that the First Circuit had not addressed a case like this one, wherein parties
agreed to expand the scope of judicial review by contract to include review
for errors of law.93 Therefore, Judge Saris relied on the fact that three circuit
courts of appeals had directly addressed contractual expansion of the FAA's
scope of review, and all three endorsed judicial review in accordance with the
agreement of the parties.94 As this decision preceded Bowen,95 the court added
that it was "not aware of any federal case which actually interprets a similar
arbitration clause and reaches a contrary result." 96
Considering in detail Judge Posner's dictum in CTU, the court concluded
that his "passing advisory reference to limited judicial review in a different
context simply cannot compete with the probing analysis by three other cir-
cuits in cases on point." 97
Although the First Circuit Court of Appeals had emphasized the narrow
scope of review, Judge Saris concluded that there was 'no reason to assume
that the First Circuit would not follow the three Circuits that favor judicial re-
view in accordance with the parties' agreement, especially since it had ap-
provingly cited Gateway for "laying out the scope of judicial review of arbi-
tration awards in the light of First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan98 and
the FAA." 99 As Judge Saris put it, "[t]he Court's reading of the First Circuit
ouija board supports the conclusion that the Court of Appeals would enforce
91. Id. at 55.
92. Id. at 57 (emphasis omitted).
93. In a footnote, the court noted that "[ilncidently, neither side suggests that Quebec law,
which prohibits judicial review of the merits unless parties stipulate to the contrary, governs
here." Id. at 62, n.7.
94. Id. at 62.
95. See supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text.
96. 10 F. Supp. 2d at 62.
97. Id. at 63.
98. 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
99. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234, 237 (lst Cir. 1995) (citing Gate-
way, 64 F.3d at 996).
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the provision at issue in the Contract."' I She went on to deal with two addi-
tional concerns, as follows:
First, one of the great benefits of arbitration is the efficient resolution of disputes without
burdening both the courts and the parties with protracted litigation. Requiring courts to
shift from a straightjacketed review of arbitral awards for problems such as corruption or
other improprieties to more searching reviews for errors of fact or law could arguably
transform arbitration "from a commercially useful alternative method of dispute resolution
into a burdensome additional step on the march through the court system". However, the
Supreme Court has unequivocally indicated its preference for accommodation of the intent
of the parties over expediency by observing that "the basic objective in this area is not to
resolve disputes in the quickest manner possible, no matter what the parties' wishes ...
but to ensure that commercial arbitration agreements, like other contracts, are enforced ac-
cording to their terms. In fact, the Supreme Court could not have been more direct on this
point: "We therefore reject the suggestion that the overriding goal of the [FAA] was to
promote the expeditious resolution of claims."' 0'
Second, allowing the courts to expand statutory standards of judicial review implicates a
prudential question, that is, what control contracts should be permitted to have over the
operation of the judiciary. The Ninth Circuit's concurrence in Lapine [sic] raises this con-
cern but was content with the result so long as the contractual standard of review did not
require diversion from the courts' normal mode of operation .... 102
Despite these two reservations, the Court feels obliged to follow the thus-far unanimous
rule of law in the federal courts.' 01 [citations omitted]
With this analysis, Judge Saris made two important observations: first,
that between accommodating the intent of the parties as it is expressed in
their agreement to arbitrate and the expediency of arbitration, the Supreme
Court made a clear choice in favor of honoring the parties' wishes. Second,
so long as the nature of the court's review on the appeal from the arbitral
award does not require it to divert from its normal mode of operation, there
is no reason not to permit parties to provide for such review by the court. In
Part III B below, Judge Saris's second observation will be discussed in more
detail, and more specifically whether this observation is correct.
100. New England Utilities, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
101. Id. (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985)).
102. Judge Saris went on to say: "Though the Court has not been asked to examine dead
animals (except, of course, the fossil fuel) here, review of errors of Quebec law, most of which
is written in French and which the Court lacks the computer-assisted or library resources to re-
search independently, is not far off .. . .[T]he issues of law here are thankfully straightforward,
but it is not hard to imagine a case in which even error of law review is unrealistic, particularly
where foreign law is implicated." She added in a footnote: "My law clerk and a librarian ven-
tured to the nether regions of the Social Law Library, the most comprehensive in Boston, and,
after plowing through layers of dust and cracking the spines of untouched tomes of Canadian
law, found no reliable compendium of the Quebecois [sic] Code." 10 F. Supp. 2d at 64, n.10.
103. Id. at 64.
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4. Bradford (Rhode Island Supreme Court, 2001)
Also in the First Circuit, but under state law, in Bradford Dyeing Ass'n,
Inc. v. J. Stog Tech. GmbH,'°4 the Supreme Court of Rhode Island implicitly
recognized the right of the parties to agree to judicial review of an arbitral
award when it overturned (on the merits) the lower court's judgment vacating
an arbitration award in favor of Stog. As will follow from the discussion in
the next three paragraphs, it appears that the court's recognition of that right
was too tentative in a situation where it would have seemed advisable to take
a more explicit position on the issue.
The parties' arbitration agreement had made the arbitration subject to the
Rhode Island arbitration provisions, but had also explicitly provided that
"[ejither party may appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction any conclusion
of law in the [arbitrator's] decision, provided, however, the findings of fact
by the arbitrator shall be absolute."' 15
After a brief analysis of the positions of the Fifth and Ninth Circuit on
the one hand (respectively in Gateway10 6 and LaPine'017 ) and observing that
the Eighth Circuit had adopted a different viewpoint (in UHC Manage-
ment'0 ), the Rhode Island Supreme Court said:
This Court, however, has not as yet had occasion to consider whether under our statutory
arbitration scheme such enlargement is permitted. Notwithstanding the observation we
make concerning the ability of the parties by their private agreement to enlarge the scope
of appellate judicial review prescribed in [the Rhode Island state statute's section setting
forth the statutory grounds for vacatur], we will for purposes of this case assume they
may, without deciding the validity of their agreement. °9
The court added in a footnote: "We leave for another day and case
whether parties may by private agreement enlarge the scope of the prescribed
limitations set out in [that section], at which time the question can be fully
briefed and argued." 110
104. 765 A.2d 1226 (R.I. 2001).
105. Id. at 1229 (emphasis added).
106. See supra notes 80-85.
107. See supra notes 45-75.
108. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
109. 765 A.2d at 1233.
110. Id. at 1233, n.ll.
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5. Hughes Training (2001, Fifth Circuit)
The Fifth Circuit, in Hughes Training, Inc. v. Cook"l ' (affirming a deci-
sion of the District Court for the Northern District of Texas), recently had the
occasion to affirm its holding in Gateway. In this employment related case,
the agreement provided that "in actions seeking to vacate an award, the stan-
dard of review to be applied to the arbitrator's findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law will be the same as that applied by an appellate court reviewing
a decision of a trial court sitting without a jury.""' 2 Holding that parties are
generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit, and that
therefore an arbitration agreement may expand judicial review of an arbitra-
tion award beyond the scope of the FAA, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Dis-
trict Court's vacating the arbitration award and entering judgment in favor of
Hughes.
From the above analysis the split between the circuits can be summa-
rized as follows: the view that parties can validly agree to allow appeal to the
federal district court that has jurisdiction over the parties (LaPine) is sup-
ported by the Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuits, and by lower courts in the
First and Second Circuits. The view that parties cannot validly agree to do so
(Bowen) is supported by the Seventh and Tenth Circuits and possibly by the
Eighth. The uncertainty created by this split raises important issues that will
shape the future of arbitral appeal and vacatur and, more specifically, future
arbitration clauses in contracts.
III. THE ISSUES RAISED BY LAPINE AND BOWEN
LaPine and Bowen address the question as to whether the parties to an
arbitration agreement can agree to expand the grounds for judicial review.
These two cases have been the subject of a great number of articles, the ma-
jority of which seem to support LaPine,l l3 with only a few commentators sid-
111. 254 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2001).
112. Id. at 590.
113. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of
Party Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199 (2000); Contractually Expanded
Standards 'Threaten' Independence Of Arbitration Process, ltYh Circuit Rules, 16 MEALEY'S INT'L
ARE. REP. No. 7 (2001); Rachel C. Corn, Recent Development: LaPine Technology Corp. v. Ky-
ocera Corp., 13 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1085 (1998); Stephen A. Hochman, Judicial Review
to Correct Arbitral Error: An Option to Consider, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 103 (1997);
Tom Cullinan, Contracting for an Expanded Scope of Judicial Review in Arbitration, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 395 (1998); Di Jiang-Schuerger, Perfect Arbitration = Arbitration Litigation?, 4 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 231 (1999); Leanne Montgomery, Expanded Judicial Review of Commercial Ar-
bitration Awards - Bargaining for the Best of Both Worlds, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 529 (2000);
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ing with the CTU and Bowen decisions. 1 4 Judging from the scholarly articles
in this area, the question of whether to enforce expanded judicial review
clauses in commercial arbitration agreements rests on contract, jurisdictional,
and public policy arguments." 5
A. The Contract Argument Supports LaPine
Since arbitration plays such a central role in commercial dispute resolu-
tion, both domestic and international, the contractual nature of arbitration
must play a significant part in the interpretation of both the FAA and applica-
ble state arbitration laws. Thus, § 2 of the FAA, which provides that an
agreement to arbitrate "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,"
has been held to be the primary purpose of the Act and to mandate the en-
forcement of arbitration agreements.11 6 Accordingly, Judge Fernandez, in La-
James M. Ringer & Martin L. Seidel, Judicial Review Clauses in Transnational Arbitration
Agreements, 12 INSIDE LITIG. 6 (May 1998); Karon A. Sasser, Freedom to Contract for Expanded
Judicial Review in Arbitration Agreements, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 337 (2000/2001); Stephen P.
Younger, Agreements to Expand the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 63 ALB. L.
REV. 241 (1999).
114. See, e.g., Kevin A. Sullivan, The Problems of Permitting Expanded Judicial Review
of Arbitration Awards under the Federal Arbitration Act, 46 ST. Louis L.J. 509 (2002); Kenneth
M. Curtin, An Examination of Contractual Expansion and Limitation of Judicial Review of Arbi-
tral Awards, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. ReSOL. 337 (2000); Andreas Lowenfeld, Can Arbitration
Co-exist with Judicial Review? A Critique of LaPine v. Kyocera, 3 ADR CURRENTS I (Sept.
1998); Hans Smit, Contractual Modification of the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards,
8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 147 (1997). See also Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, Section 23B.
Comment on the Concept of Contractual Provisions for "Opt-In" Review of Awards, available at
www.law.upenn.edu/blUucluarba/arbitratl2l3.htm (last visited February 11, 2003).
115. Montgomery, supra note 113, at 550. See also Jiang-Schuerger, supra note 113, at
236-237.
116. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). See also, Dean Whitter Reynolds
in which the Court said:
[W]e must not overlook this principal objective when construing the statute, or allow the
fortuitous impact of the Act on efficient dispute resolution to overshadow the underlying motiva-
tion. Indeed, this conclusion is compelled by the Court's recent holding in Moses H. Cone Mem'l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), in which we affirmed an order requiring en-
forcement of an arbitration agreement, even though the arbitration would result in bifurcated pro-
ceedings. That misfortune, we noted, "occurs because the relevant federal law requires piecemeal
resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement." Dean Witter Reynolds v.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220-21 (1985).
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Pine, relied on the Supreme Court's elaboration of that principle in Volt" 7 and
First Options, 8 and decided that "the primary purpose of the FAA is to en-
sure enforcement of private agreements to arbitrate, in accordance with the
agreements' terms."119
Two commentators argue that the parties' ability to agree on rules that
differ from the FAA is conditioned on two limits: first, that the parties must
exhibit a clear and unmistakable intent to provide for arbitral appeal, and sec-
ond, that the parties' agreement cannot undermine the FAA's policy of enforc-
ing agreements to arbitrate.2 0 This author agrees, but would add a third re-
quirement, namely that the parties' agreement cannot undermine other
mandatory provisions contained in the FAA.' 2'
Certain other commentators' 22 note, however, that the line of cases stand-
ing for the proposition that the FAA's paramount goal is to honor and enforce
the agreement between the parties ought to be distinguished as being purely
procedural in nature, whereas the issue of whether there is a contractual right
to allow the losing party to appeal from an arbitral award to the court having
jurisdiction over the parties ought to be regarded as substantive. They argue
that cases such as Volt 12 3 (enforcing the parties' agreement concerning the
choice of law governing the arbitration process), Mastrobuono24 (allowing the
arbitrator to impose punitive damages), and First Options'25 (allowing the ar-
bitrator to decide the issue of the scope of issues that may be arbitrated) are
all procedural in nature, whereas the parties' agreement to allow "expanded
judicial review" would be substantive in nature. The underlying reason for
the argument is found in the fact that the vacatur procedure of § 10(a) FAA
relates to the "substantive enforcement of the award," and these commenta-
tors believe that allowing the parties to contract with respect to such substan-
tive enforcement would endanger the integrity of the arbitral process.'26
117. Volt, 489 U.S. at 478-479.
118. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (holding "arbitra-
tion is simply a matter of contract between the parties.")
119. LaPine, 130 F.3d at 888.
120. Montgomery, supra note 113, at 551; Jiang-Schuerger, supra note 113, at 244 (citing
Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628.
121. See infra notes 525-265, and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Curtin, supra note 114, at 363-364; Sullivan, supra note 114, at 528.
123. See supra note 117.
124. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 55 (1995).
125. See supra note 118.
126. Curtin, supra note 114, at 364; Sullivan, supra note 114, at 526 (citing Mitsubishi
Motors, 473 U.S. 614, 638 where the Supreme Court discussed possible substantive review of an
award to be rendered in Japan on the basis of a defense available under Art. V(2)(b) of the New
York Convention, which is comparable to a vacatur proceeding. See infra note 237 and accompa-
24
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This argument seems to contradict the line of cases that holds that the
Federal Arbitration Act "creates a body of federal substantive law."' 27 None-
theless, the argument appears to be persuasive, but only insofar as the vacatur
procedure of Section 10(a) is concerned. When, as is discussed in Part IV be-
low, a differentiation is made between vacatur and arbitral appeal, the reason-
ing about procedural versus substantive issues in the context of judicial re-
view of arbitral awards becomes largely meaningless. In any event, if it were
relevant to distinguish between procedural and substantive aspects of federal
arbitration law, it is suggested that whereas the vacatur procedure of Section
10(a) concerns the substantive enforcement of the award, an agreement al-
lowing arbitral appeal is more procedural in nature and is correctly grouped
with the cases referred to above and relied upon by the Ninth Circuit in
LaPine2 .
The CTU and Bowen courts, which oppose parties' ability to include a
clause in their agreement providing for "expanded judicial review," argue
that there is a different limit to the parties' ability to agree on arbitral rules:
the parties cannot create federal jurisdiction by contract. Professor Hans Smit,
who argued that contractual modification of the scope of judicial review is
"wholly incompatible with the essence of arbitration as we know it,' 1 29 ex-
panded upon this argument, first voiced by Judge Posner in the now famous
dictum in CTU.
B. The Jurisdictional Argument Supports Bowen
Judge Posner, writing for the majority in CTU, 30 was the first to suggest
that an agreement between parties to submit the award to appeal by a federal
district court is tantamount to creating federal subject matter jurisdiction for
the court, something that cannot be done by contract.' Expanding on this ju-
nying text. Mitsubishi Motors did not discuss the issue of substantive review ,in the context of ar-
bitral appeal.).
127. Southland, 465 US 1, 12 (1984) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. at 1, 25, n. 32 (1983).
128. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
129. Smit, supra note 114, at 149.
130. Chicago Typographical Union, 935 F.2d at 1505.
131. Art. lI, § 2, cl. I of the U.S. Constitution limits the subject matter jurisdiction of the
federal courts to certain "cases or controversies." Pursuant to 28 USC § 1331, "the district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States." Pursuant to 28 USC § 1332, the federal district courts have juris-
25
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risdictional argument, Professor Hans Smit posited that the parties' agreement
is irrelevant because they have no authority to determine how public re-
sources are spent and are not free to alter the judicial process. Permitting
contractual modification of the scope of judicial review 13 undermines the
public policy of encouraging arbitration and lessens the social desirability of
arbitration by causing fewer arbitral awards to be final dispositions. 3 3 The
Bowen' 34 and Crowel1135 courts also relied on the jurisdictional argument,
lending support to this theory by citing Professor Smit's article.
Judge Kozinski, in his concurring opinion in LaPine, 36 also briefly dis-
cussed this issue and concluded that, indeed, what the district court is asked
to do by an arbitration clause such as the one in LaPine is not a subset of
what it would be doing if the case were brought under diversity or federal
question jurisdiction.' "It's not just less work, it is different work."' But
even if Congress has nowhere authorized courts to review arbitral awards
under the standard adopted by the parties, Judge Kozinski concluded that the
Court should nonetheless enforce the arbitration agreement according to its
terms, "[g]iven the strong policy of party empowerment embodied in the Ar-
bitration Act."' 139
Judge Kozinski added that he would have called the case differently if
the parties' agreement had provided that the district court review the award
by flipping a coin or studying the entrails of a dead fowl. 40 In such event,
the parties would have called upon the courts to perform a task that is totally
different from the one they are accustomed to perform, that of reviewing the
findings of fact or conclusions of law set forth in the arbitral award. Here, at
least, the district court would perform a duty that is not foreign to it.
diction in cases where there is diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000. The U.S. Supreme Court has held consistently that Congress enacted the Federal Arbi-
tration Act pursuant to the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and, by implication, that Con-
gress did not intend to confer independent federal subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, Section 2
FAA is held to be a "body of substantive law" that is "enforceable in both state and federal
courts." Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987). See also Southland, 465 U.S. at 12.
132. Smit, supra note 114, at 150.
133. Id. Professor Smit's point of view is consistent in that he disagrees not only with the
cases permitting pre-dispute agreements that provide for arbitral appeal, but he also contends that
the FAA provides the exclusive grounds to set aside an arbitral award. Thus, he also rejects the
cases creating non-statutory vacatur grounds. Id. at 148.
134. 254 F.3d 295.
135. 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810.
136. 130 F.3d at 891. See also supra notes 90-103.
137. 130 F.3d at 891.
138. Id. (emphasis in original).
139. Id.
140. Id.
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An interesting rebuttal to the jurisdictional argument is contained in
Judge Nott's dissenting opinion in Crowell,141 which distinguishes between the
courts' subject matter jurisdiction on the one hand, and courts acting in ex-
cess of jurisdiction on the other, a phenomenon Judge Nott finds to be not
uncommon both in criminal and civil cases. In addition, noting that this case
involved a contract between two equal and sophisticated parties, Judge Nott
felt the losing party was barred by estoppel from complaining about his con-
tractual bargain to have arbitral appeal. Giving an extensive overview of the
case law, Judge Nott opined:
[Tihe majority has confused the concept of lack of fundamental jurisdiction (which this
case does not involve) with the concept of acting in excess of jurisdiction. Under the lat-
ter concept, parties may (under the appropriate circumstances) agree to have a trial court
act beyond its statutory authority. If they so agree, they are estopped from later com-
plaining. That is exactly what occurred here. The parties consented to heightened judicial
review as a consideration for executing and performing the contract. Neither may now
challenge the ability of the trial court to act beyond its statutory authority.
42
Judge Nott's analysis that the state court acts in excess of jurisdiction is
not dissimilar to that of Judge Kozinski in LaPine with respect to the federal
district court. Ordinarily, the state court, reviewing an arbitral award "on ap-
peal," does not do anything materially different than an appeals court does
when it reviews the lower court's judgment. The difference is that it is the
court of first instance that is asked by the parties' arbitration agreement to sit
as an appeals court, which is an activity that it probably is not used to per-
forming, even if in most state court jurisdictions the trial court may sit as an
appeals court hearing appeals from limited jurisdiction and/or small claims
courts. 143 Judge Nott is generally correct when he says that the trial court
does something it does not ordinarily do, and therefore could be said to act in
excess of its jurisdiction. Although the distinction may be material, in the
end, the activity of review of an arbitral appeal does not ask the court system
as a whole to perform a task that is totally different from what courts are or-
dinarily asked to do.
Professor Sarah Rudolph Cole takes a different approach suggesting that
the courts have improperly ignored congressionally and constitutionally im-
141. See supra note 28.
142. Crowell, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d at 818.
143. For examples where federal district courts heard cases on appeal, see infra note 144
and accompanying text.
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posed limitations on judicial power. 144 She points out that Judge Posner's
analysis in CTU confuses jurisdictional limitations with restrictions on the
court's power to render decisions.145 Prof. Cole argues, correctly in this au-
thor's opinion, that the FAA does not create an independent basis for federal
jurisdiction. 146 A party seeking to challenge an arbitral award in district court
must first establish federal question or diversity jurisdiction. 47 Thus, the ques-
tion is not whether the parties have created federal jurisdiction, but rather
whether the court has the judicial power to grant review on bases other than
those identified in the FAA. Professor Cole suggests that the courts need to
develop a uniform approach for evaluating party requests. She concludes that
requests for "expanded" review of arbitral awards should be approved so
long as they do not require arbitrary and capricious decision-making by the
court. 1
48
In addition to the notion that Professor Cole raised this so-called juris-
dictional issue is actually a question of judicial power, there is an additional
point that may make this theoretical obstacle appear less compelling. That is
the analogy that can be drawn with the forum selection clause. When parties
decide not to opt for arbitration but to resolve their disputes in the courts, it
is quite common to include in their agreement a provision that selects a spe-
cific court, or a "competent" court in a specified location, before which they
want to litigate the dispute to the exclusion of all other courts. The location
of that court may have little or nothing to do with the transaction or the dom-
icile of the parties. For example, the contract may specify the federal district
court for the Southern District of New York, even though the parties are in
California and Germany respectively. Assuming that the jurisdictional require-
ments are met, the chosen court will generally assume the judicial power to
144. Cole, supra note 113, at 1245.
145. Id.
146. For a contrary view, see Lowenfield, supra note 114. Lowenfield believes the juris-
diction of the district courts under the FAA is precise and limited, as set out in Sections 10 and
11 FAA. Id. at 15-16. He also points to the limited jurisdiction of district courts to hear appeals
in other areas of federal civil procedure: under 28 U.S.C. § 158, district judges have jurisdiction
to hear appeals from final judgments and some interlocutory orders issued by bankruptcy judges;
under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), district judges have jurisdiction to review legal determinations of the
Secretary of Health and Human Services under portions of the Social Security Act. Id. at 18, n.
31. Lowenfield notes that "[t]here may be a few other instances in which district judges have
been authorized to hear appeals, but certainly not many." Id.
147. LaPine, 130 F.3d at 891 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'I Hosp, 460 U.S. at 25, n. 32).
148. Cole, supra note 113, at 1262-1263. Professor Cole refers back to Judge Kozinski's
suggestion that he would view the case differently if the district court had been asked to review
the award by "flipping a coin or studying the entrails of a dead fowl. See supra note 140.
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hear the dispute. 49
Rephrasing Judge Fernandez' words in LaPine,150 Richard Johnston aptly
summed up the most practical argument in opposition to the jurisdictional ar-
gument put forth in CTU (and therefore Bowen): "As long as the scope of re-
view in the arbitration agreement provides for a lesser role for the courts than
a full trial on the merits, there is no offense to the court system, since with-
out a voluntary agreement to arbitrate the parties would be entitled to a full
court trial on the merits in the first place."''
When looking at the issue of whether to permit an arbitral appeal provi-
sion in pre-dispute agreements from the jurisdictional perspective, the CTU
court's fear that contractually expanded judicial review of arbitral awards
would have a burdensome effect on the courts may be misplaced. The con-
trary may even be true, as illustrated by the (logical) consequence of the ma-
jority decision in Crowell; when the court concluded that the parties' agree-
ment to allow appeal to the courts from the arbitral award was invalid, the
entire arbitration agreement became invalid and the case had to be tried in
court. 15 2 Thus, there are both strong theoretical and practical arguments
against the jurisdictional argument.
149. The recent case, Chateau Des Charmes Wines Ltd. v. Sabate USA, Inc., 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4406 (N.D. Cal. 2002), summed up the law concerning forum selection clauses as
follows: Forum selection clauses are presumptively valid and will be enforced unless the party
opposing the clause can "clearly show that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or
that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching." The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972). The "concern of international comity, respect for the ca-
pacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international
commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes" strongly favor enforcement of
forum selection clauses in international contracts. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985); see also In Re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 659 F.2d
789, 795 (7th Cir.1981) (holding "special deference [is] owed to forum-selection clauses in inter-
national contracts.").
150. 130 F.3d at 889. See also Jiang-Schuerer, supra note 113, at 238 (concluding that the
FAA is not based on Article I of the United States Constitution but on Congress' power to reg-
ulate interstate commerce).
151. Richard Johnston, Grounding the FAA: Judicial Review of International Arbitration -
Lapine v. Kyocera (citing Fils et Cables d'Acier de Lens v. Midland Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp.
240, 243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (available at www.student.Richmond.edu/-rjglb/Spring1999.html
(hereinafter the "Richmond Symposium")). See also LaPine, 130 F.3d at 889.
152. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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C. The Public Policy Argument
In addition to citing "congressional intent," Professor Smit also raises
public policy concerns that weigh against allowing parties to agree to file an
appeal from an arbitral award to the competent court. First, he argues that the
law intended to exclude arbitral appeal in order to avoid the "socially most
reprehensible" consequence of changing the benefit of arbitration from "adju-
dication in a single instance" into a "device for adding still another instance
to the usual three instances of litigation in the ordinary courts."' 53 Although
allowing arbitral appeal indeed creates the possibility that the losing party in
the arbitration will pursue litigation in the ordinary courts in three instances,
this concern seems to pertain more to the question of whether contracting for
arbitral appeal is a smart decision than whether the parties should be allowed
to have that choice available to them.
This issue has since been addressed by Judge Saris in New England Util-
ities 54 in which she discussed what appears to be two sides of the same coin,
namely the potential loss of efficiency of arbitration and the loss of arbitra-
tion's contribution to reducing the caseload of the judicial system. Much
along the lines of what Professor Smit warned against, Judge Saris reasoned
that allowing parties to agree to arbitral appeal could turn arbitration from an
alternative method of dispute resolution into simply another step to enter the
court system. 55 Judge Saris was mindful, however, of Dean Witter Reynolds
Inc. v. Byrd,'56 which held that allowing arbitration to go forward would ef-
fectively bifurcate the proceeding, permitting one portion of the case to be ar-
bitrated while the other part would end up in court, resulting in an inefficient
use of separate proceedings in different forums. Nonetheless, a unanimous
Supreme Court made clear that it preferred to honor the parties' wishes over
the FAA's admitted goal of promoting expeditious resolution of claims.'57
Judge Saris' reasoning implies, as did the Supreme Court's in Dean Witter,
that even if the parties to an agreement may have made an unwise decision
by agreeing to submit the arbitral award to judicial review, honoring the wish
of the parties takes precedence over the FAA's goal of promoting expeditious
resolution of claims.
Second, Professor Smit discerns the jurisdictional argument in terms of a
public policy issue by noting that the extent to which a court may review an
153. Smit, supra note 114, at 147-48.
154. 10 F. Supp. 2d 53.
155. Id. at 64.
156. 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985).
157. See generally Sasser, supra note 113, at 355.
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arbitral award is a function of the political judgment of a body politic within
the context of how judicial resources are to be used. In making this judgment,
the body politic may take into account the interests of the parties involved in
having the kind of review they wish to have. But, Professor Smit argues, the
ultimate decision is not to be made by the parties, but by that body politic. 5 8
This author agrees with Professor Smit insofar as he implies that the issue
comes down to a policy choice.'59
However, it would seem entirely consistent with the extent to which the
Supreme Court has reshaped the world of arbitration by construing the FAA
in a succession of decisions far beyond what many argue was its originally
intended scope, 60 to suggest that while there is no specific provision in the
FAA that deals with the issue, it can be decided by the courts and is not
within the exclusive province of Congress. As Judge Fernandez suggested in
LaPine, it is probably more reasonable to find that § 2 of the FAA demands
that the primary purpose of the FAA be followed, namely to ensure enforce-
ment of private agreements to arbitrate in accordance with the agreements'
terms-even when that agreement provides for the possibility of appealing the
arbitral award.
Third, Professor Smit suggests that arbitral appeal would not only under-
mine the public policy of encouraging arbitration, but would also be socially
undesirable, because it would stifle the creative solutions frequently advanced
by arbitrators.' 6' The readiness of party-selected experts to propose such solu-
tions would be adversely affected by allowing the merits of awards made by
them to be reviewed by judges not specifically selected for their experience
and independence. 62 Although statistical information is lacking on this point,
this author believes the number of cases in which there is a real opportunity
for the arbitrator (as opposed to a mediator) to propose creative solutions
should not be overestimated. Nonetheless, with respect to cases in which such
opportunity may foreseeably exist, Professor Smit's argument is persuasive
and ought to encourage the parties to decide not to submit the award to arbi-
158. Smit, supra note 114, at 150.
159. See infra notes 181-183 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 (1987)(Stevens, J., dissenting); Jean R.
Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Courts Preference for Binding
Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996).
161. Smit, supra note 114, at 138.
162. Smit, supra note 114, at 151-52.
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tral appeal. This author prefers to see Professor Smit's argument as an ele-
ment playing a role in the parties' decision whether or not to include an arbi-
tral appeal provision in their contract. It does not appear to address the
question of why the law should not permit the parties to make that choice.
Each of the three arguments discussed in Part III (the contractual, the ju-
risdictional and the public policy argument) support the view permitting par-
ties to agree to submit their arbitral award to review by the court that has ju-
risdiction over the parties. However, the analysis of the issue becomes more
transparent when the issue is no longer seen as a question of "expanded judi-
cial review."
IV. REFRAMING THE ISSUE: ARBITRAL APPEAL VS. VACATUR
In order to be able to analyze how the LaPine doctrine interacts with the
FAA, the author has found it helpful to reframe the issue. 163 Instead of fram-
ing the issue in terms of "expanded judicial review" and "heightened scru-
tiny by the courts" beyond the statutory grounds set forth in § 10(a) 161 of the
FAA, it is more accurately framed by making a distinction between "vaca-
tur" and "arbitral appeal." Proper nomenclature can refer, on one hand, to
the grounds for setting aside an arbitral award found in § 10 of the FAA 6 ' as
"grounds for annulment" (or "vacatur," sought by a party's "challenge" of
the award), and, on the other hand, to the parties' agreement to submit the
award to judicial review on the legal and/or factual merits as "arbitral
appeal." 166
The only thing a vacatur procedure has in common with an arbitral ap-
peal is that in both cases the arbitral award may be confirmed or declared to
be of no effect. That is where the similarity stops; this is not an issue
163. Judge Fernandez framed the issue in LaPine as follows: "Is federal court review of
an arbitration agreement necessarily limited to the grounds set forth in the FAA or can the court
apply greater scrutiny, if the parties have so agreed?" 130 F.3d at 887 (emphasis added).
164. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
165. Whether or not together with the non-statutory grounds developed by case law, in-
cluding "manifest disregard of the law" and "against public policy." For an extensive discussion
of both the statutory and the non-statutory grounds, as well as their respective desirability, see
Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the Relationship
Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 443
(1998). Professor Hayford distinguishes four non-statutory grounds for vacatur of commercial ar-
bitration awards: (i) manifest disregard of the law; (ii) conflict with a clear and well-established
public policy; (iii) the award is found to be "arbitrary or capricious" or "completely irrational";
and (iv) failure of the award to "draw its essence" from the parties' contract. Id. at 450-51, 461-
88.
166. The text of the English Arbitration Act of 1996 may be found at www.hmso.gov.uk/
acts/actsl996, last visited on Feb. 16, 2003 .
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whether or not the statutory grounds for vacatur (in the sense of annulling
and setting aside an award) can, or ought to, be expanded to include judicial
review on the merits. There is a profound difference between (i) reviewing
(and setting aside an award) on the basis of allegations of fraud, partiality or
corruption, procedural misbehavior, or arbitrators exceeding their powers,
1 67
and (ii) reviewing (and possibly overturning) an award on appeal on the basis
of allegations of error(s) by the arbitrator(s) in the findings of fact and/or the
conclusions of applicable law. If the foregoing is true, appeal from an arbitral
award needs to be viewed as an avenue of judicial review that is wholly sep-
arate and distinct from the vacatur procedure.
This distinction is supported by comparing the grounds for challenges of
an award set forth in §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA with the grounds upon which
a judgment can be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 168 Although the grounds for vacating or correcting a judg-
ment are much broader 169 than those for vacating or correcting an arbitral
award, they are similar. Obviously, the grounds of FRCP Rule 60(b) are dis-
tinguishable and separate from the entire appeals process by which one can
take an appeal from a judgment. The distinction between appeal from a judg-
ment and vacatur of a judgment played a role in one case where the failure
of a party to appeal from a judgment was held not to serve as a bar to a later
attempt to vacate the judgment.7 0
The differentiation between vacatur and arbitral appeal is further sup-
ported by comparing the grounds for vacatur of an arbitral award with the
grounds upon which a foreign judgment can be refused to be recognized, i7'
167. FAA, § 10(a), (1)-(4), supra note 13. A comprehensive review of the case law per-
taining to the four statutory grounds for vacatur can also be found in Sullivan, supra note 114, at
516-19.
168. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). For a review of relief from judgments, see generally, 47 AM.
JUR. 2D Judgments §§ 740-872 (providing an overview of the grounds therefor in §§ 775-851).
169. In fact, as a result of item (6) of Rule 60(b), the grounds for vacating a judgment are
practically unlimited. In. essence, Rule 60(b)(6) provides that on motion and upon such terms as
are just, the court may relieve a party from a final judgment for any reason other than the ones
enumerated that justifies relief from the operation of the judgment. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2106.
170. Van De Ryt v. Van De Ryt, 6 Ohio St. 2d 31 (1966). "The remedies of appeal and
vacation are 'cumulative' or, more precisely, 'alternative'; a party need not prosecute an appeal
as a condition precedent to moving for a vacation of a judgment." Id. at 35. See also Donaldson
v. Donaldson, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5017.
171. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 81 (1982). Generally, the rules of
recognition of judgments of courts within the United States, state or federal, derive from the Full
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and the language used in the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition
Act,'72 all of which, as might be expected, are very similar both to each other
and to the grounds for vacatur set forth in §10(a) FAA.
The distinction is further supported by looking at the arbitration statutes
of other countries that list grounds (comparable to §10(a) of the FAA) upon
which the arbitral award can be challenged in one section of the statute, and
which expressly provide for, or prohibit, the possibility of an arbitral appeal
in a different section of that statute. For example, Section 68 of the English
Arbitration Act of 1996 enumerates grounds for vacatur, whereas Section 69
of the Act provides for "Appeal on Points of Law."' 73 The same is true for
Faith and Credit Clause of Art. IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution. A judgment is
valid for this purpose if the rendering court had jurisdiction of the subject matter, had territorial
jurisdiction and if adequate notice was given to the party assertedly bound by the judgment. id.
at Comment a. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 et seq. (1987,
2002); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 92 et seq., § 98 (1971, 1989).
172. Section 4 of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act provides as
follows:
§ 4. Grounds for Non-recognition.
(a) A foreign judgment is not conclusive if (1) the judgment was rendered under a system
which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due
process of law;
(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant; or
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.
(b) A foreign judgment need not be recognized if (1) the defendant in the proceedings in the
foreign court did not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud; (3) the [cause of action] [claim for relief] on which
the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state;
(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment; (5) the proceeding in
the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between the parties under which the dispute in
question was to be settled otherwise than by proceedings in that court; or (6) in the case of juris-
diction based only on personal service, the foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum for
the trial of the action.
173. Interestingly, Article 45 of the English Arbitration Act of 1996 (and at least some of
the Acts - wholly or partially - modeled after it) also continue the English tradition of al-
lowing a party to make an application to the court to determine any question of law arising in
the course of the proceedings in the event the court is satisfied that it substantially affects the
rights of one or more of the parties. This useful feature is somewhat comparable to the judicial
system of Art. 234 TEC (formerly Art. 177 EEC), pursuant to which any member - state court
can submit a question of EU law to the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg for clarifica-
tion. In a decision of the European Court of Justice of March 23, 1982, "Nordsee," the court
ruled that an arbitrator does not have the authority to submit questions pursuant to what is now
Art. 234 TEC to the European Court, and that instead it is up to "the ordinary courts [that are]
called upon to examine [the award] either in the context of their collaboration with arbitration
tribunals ...or in the course of a review of the arbitration award" (whether in the event of an
appeal, for setting aside, for leave to enforce the award or upon any other form of action or re-
view available under the relevant national legislation) to ascertain whether it is necessary for it to
make a reference to the European Court under Art. 234 TEC. Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei
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the French New Code of Civil Procedure, which enumerates grounds for va-
catur in Article 1484, whereas Article 1482 provides for appeal unless the
parties have agreed otherwise. 74 Similarly, Part VI of the Belgian Code
Judiciaire / Gerechtelijk Wetboek distinguishes between a petition for annul-
ment in Article 1704, and Article 1703(2) providing that appeal from an arbi-
tral award may be instituted (only) if the parties have included a provision to
that effect in the arbitration agreement. Also, the Netherlands Code of Civil
Procedure, in Articles 1064 through 1068, deals with the procedure for annul-
ment (with the possible grounds enumerated in Article 1065), whereas Article
1050 deals with "Arbitral Appeal."' 75
Thus, the distinction between appeal and vacatur is amply supported, not
only by comparing vacatur of arbitral awards with other annulment proce-
dures in our legal system, but also by comparing our system with the arbitra-
tion laws of other countries. The relevancy of the distinction will become im-
mediately clear when we look at the court's analysis of "expanded judicial
review" in Bowen.'76 Notably, when we review Judge Tascha's reasoning in
the two paragraphs quoted earlier 177 realizing that it is not arbitral appeal that
is dealt with in §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA, but rather the (limited) grounds for
setting aside an award, the court's reasoning loses its foundation. Seen in this
light, the court's argument seems supportive of limiting the grounds for vaca-
GmbH v. Reederei Mond Hochseefischerei Nordstern AG & Co. KG, Case No. 102/81 (1982)
E.C.R. 1095. This holding was confirmed in Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton International
NV, Case No. C-126/97, 20 E.C.R. 392 (1999). This is now seen as unfortunate, since arbitra-
tors are asked more and more to interpret EU law (including, e.g., questions of competition law)
as a result of the general tendency to decentralize the administration of the European judicial sys-
tem. See generally Carl Baudenbacher & Imeida Higgins, Decentralization of EC Competition
Law Enforcement and Arbitration, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1 (2002).
174. Art. 1481-91 N.C.P.C.
175. Art. 1050 (1) Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering provides: "An appeal from
the arbitral award to a second arbitral tribunal is possible only if the parties have agreed
thereto." This section has been held to mean that no appeal is available under Dutch law from
the arbitral award to the court system. W. Hugenholtz, Hoofdlijnen van het Nederlands Burgerlijk
Procesrecht 245 (Utrecht 1994). An English translation of Book Four of the Dutch Code of Civil
Procedure may be found at www.tamara-arbitration.nllEnglish/act.html. Similarly, Article 595 (1)
of the Austrian Zivilprozepordnung (ZPO) lists the grounds for annulment ("Aufhebung-
sgrunde"), whereas Art. 594 (1) provides that between the parties the arbitral award has the ef-
fect of a valid court judgment unless the parties have agreed to the possibility of appeal before a
higher arbitral tribunal ("lnstanz").
176. Bowen, 254 F.3d 925.
177. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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tur to the provisions of §10(a) FAA, but has little to do with whether or not
to permit the parties to enter into a pre-dispute agreement that submits the
award to arbitral appeal before the courts. The relevancy of the distinction
and its ramifications are reflected upon in Parts V and VI below.
V. ARBITRAL APPEAL, A POLICY DECISION
A. Whether to Allow Arbitral Appeal is a Policy Choice
While there is no express provision in the FAA that permits parties to
agree to arbitral appeal, there is nothing in the Act that prohibits or otherwise
prevents the parties from doing so. Even if in 1925 the FAA was considered
"a comprehensive integrated modem arbitration law,"' 78 compared to the ar-
bitration statutes that have been adopted in the last fifteen to twenty years
such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion' 17 9 and the English Arbitration Act of 1996,180 the FAA cannot be seen as
a complete set of rules governing all aspects of arbitration. Thus, absent an
explicit provision in the Act which either allows or prohibits arbitral appeal,
and without any help from the legislative history, 8 ' this issue is one of
policy., 2
Which policy to follow depends in large measure on whether one's pref-
erence goes to upholding the original benefit of arbitration as a method for
efficient adjudication in a single instance, or whether one prefers upholding
the principle of freedom of contract in this instance. It would appear that
under the doctrine of contractual freedom in general, and under the FAA in
particular (as explained in Volt" 3), the better policy favors giving parties a
right to choose whether or not to include arbitral appeal in their contracts.
178. Macneil, supra note 5, at 102. See also Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of South-
land: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 101 (2002).
179. Counting a total of 36 articles. See infra note 200.
180. Counting a total of 84 articles in Part I and another 25 articles in I through IV as
well as four schedules. Even so, the English Act was deliberately not intended to be exhaustive.
See infra note 311.
181. "[Y]et, over the past decade, the Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining
congressional intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building instead, case by case, an
ediface of its own creation." Hulbert, in Richmond Symposium, supra note 151, at 9 (quoting Al-
lied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, supra note 30, 513 U.S. at 283
(1995)(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
182. Accord, Yasuhei Taniguchi, in Richmond Symposium, supra note 151 at 5; Hulbert, in
Richmond Symposium, supra note 15 1, at 9.
183. 489 U.S. at 478 (holding that the FAA's principal purpose is to ensure that private ar-
bitration agreements are enforced according to their terms).
36
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol3/iss2/2
[Vol. 3: 157, 2003]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
B. More Policy Considerations Favor Allowing Arbitral Appeal
As was noted at the outset of this article, there exists a clear tension
concerning the finality of arbitral awards. On the one hand, a principal bene-
fit of arbitration is that generally the arbitral award is final and binding upon
the parties. In its ideal form therefore, arbitration has been a relatively quick
and efficient way to resolve a dispute. Unfortunately, partly because of the in-
creasing complexity of cases submitted to arbitration, partly because there is a
tendency among litigants to use (or abuse, depending on one's point of view)
every procedural trick available to them to stall or delay the progress of the
arbitration and the execution of the award, nowadays arbitration can some-
times take longer that litigation in the courts, especially when a "fast track"
procedure is available in the court system, and is unavailable and not contrac-
tually provided for in the arbitration proceeding.
On the other hand, as arbitrators are asked to interpret more complex le-
gal issues, that same finality is increasingly felt as the absence of much
needed quality control over arbitrators.'1 A contractual provision allowing ap-
peal to the courts may well be the sort of compromise that persuades a reluc-
tant party to agree to arbitration in the first place. It is submitted here that the
policy considerations in favor of allowing parties to include such an appeal
clause outweigh the considerations against the possibility of arbitral appeal.
The autonomy of the parties to provide in their contract what they con-
sider to be necessary or desirable" 5 supports the idea that they ought to be
empowered to choose whether or not to opt for arbitral appeals from the
awards made by their chosen arbitrators. As the Australian professor
Chukwumerije said, "[c]omplete exclusion of the right of appeal denies them
the ability to make this choice." '
184. See supra note 11.
185. The principle of party autonomy is one of the three general principles laid out in Sec-
tion 1 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 § 1(b) provides: "The parties should be free to agree
how their disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public
interest."
186. Okezie Chukwumerije, English Arbitration Act 1996: Reform and Consolidation of
English Arbitration Law, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 21 (1997).
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C. Practical Reasons to Allow Arbitral Appeal
In addition to the desire to recognize that the core objective of the FAA
is to ensure that the parties' arbitration agreement is enforced in accordance
with its terms, there are practical reasons why it is desirable to allow the par-
ties this choice. First, as arbitration is used more frequently in complex cases
in which arbitrators are asked to interpret questions of statutory law,"8 7 arbi-
tration has taken on a much more judicial character than the original arbitra-
tion between merchants of old. As parties foresee that complex statutory is-
sues may play a role, they may decide that the expertise of the arbitrator(s)
whom the parties will eventually agree upon ought not be the only one(s) to
be relied upon for the purpose of interpreting such laws.
Second, in more cases then before, the amount potentially in controversy
is so high 8' that the commercial risk of submitting a case to the judgment of
just one panel of neutrals may appear to the parties to be too high. Third,
even if parties are relatively equal in size or bargaining power, one of the
parties may be concerned about the risk that the arbitrator will be biased to-
wards one of the parties. The party that is the "outsider" may well prefer ar-
bitral appeal to reduce or eliminate the risk of potential of bias.
Fourth, any such party who only occasionally enters into an agreement
to arbitrate, in contrast to the other side that signs a lot of those agreements,
may well decide that the costs associated with an erroneous award outweigh
considerations of the relative speed and reduced costs of the arbitration.189
And in certain cases, the combined process of arbitration and arbitral appeal
to the courts may still be quicker and less expensive than a full-blown trial,
especially when the appeal is limited to questions of law. 190
D. Precedents in the Laws of Other Countries
The arbitration laws of many countries'9' expressly provide for the possi-
187. Examples include antitrust, patent, intellectual property, and securities cases.
188. As it was in LaPine, see supra note 73; infra note 287.
189. See generally Cole, supra note 113, at 1240-1243.
190. Accord Younger, supra note 113, at 262.
191. Contra Smit, supra note 114, at 147. Although Professor Smit asserts that "arbitra-
tion acts all around the world and all international conventions relating to the recognition and en-
forcement of arbitral awards permit judicial review only to a very limited extent," a substantial
number of arbitration acts do permit, either freely or under fairly broad conditions, arbitral ap-
peal. In addition, the New York Convention, in the wording of Articles V(1)(e) and VI, may well
have contemplated the possibility of arbitral appeal. In defense of Professor Smit, it must be
noted that his article appears to have been written prior to the adoption of the English Arbitration
Act 1996, as he refers to the English situation by referring to the Mustill Report that preceded
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bility of arbitral appeal. 92 As discussed in Part IV above, 193 unlimited appeal
exists in countries such as Belgium, 94 and France (domestic only),19 whereas,
for example, England, 96 all states of Australia, 97 Hong Kong (domestic
the adoption of the Act by several years.
192. When the applicable statute makes no distinction between domestic and international
arbitration, this would of course include appeal in international arbitration. This is contrary to the
suggestion made by Hulbert that there is no disposition in other countries that he knows of to ac-
cept the notion of "broadened review " (arbitral appeal) in international arbitration. Hulbert, in
Richmond Symposium, supra note 151. However, the drafters of the new English Arbitration Act
1996 opted for arbitral appeal even in international arbitration. For a discussion of the history of
this issue, see Marianne Roth & Tobias Brinkmann, New Arbitral Legislation: The English Arbi-
tration Act 1996 - A Comparative Assessment, 5 CROAT. ARB. Y.B. 49, 67-68 (1998).
193. See supra notes 173-175.
194. Article 1703 (2) Code Judiciaire / Gerechtelijk Wetboek (provided the parties have
provided for arbitral appeal in their arbitral agreement). Interestingly, Belgium, in the hope of be-
coming a more attractive forum for international commercial arbitration, enacted an amendment
to the Code Judiciaire in 1985 completely eliminating the possibility of challenging arbitral
awards on vacatur grounds in disputes between foreign parties who were neither residents or had
any branch in Belgium. As a result of the very substantial objections to this amendment by the
international business community, in 1998 Belgium amended its law for a second time and re-
introduced (in Article 1717(4) Code judiciaire) as a default rule the possibility of challenging ar-
bitral awards on vacatur grounds, but providing for the possibility for such foreign parties to
eliminate by contract some or all of the vacatur grounds. See generally William W. Park, Why
Courts Review Arbitral Awards, 2 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. Q.L.REv. 121, 125 (2001). See also infra
notes 262-265 and accompanying text.
195. Article 1482 Nouveau code de procddure civile ("NCPC"). The appeals procedure is
called a "recours reformation", whereas the vacatur procedure is called a "recours en annula-
tion". See also infra note 239.
196. Section 69 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 reads as follows:
Section 69 - Appeal on point of law.
(1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party to arbitral proceedings may (upon notice
to the other parties and to the tribunal) appeal to the court on a question of law arising out of an
award made in the proceedings. An agreement to dispense with reasons for the tribunal's award
shall be considered an agreement to exclude the court's jurisdiction under this section.
(2) An appeal shall not be brought under this section except -
(a) with the agreement of all the other parties to the proceedings, or
(b) with the leave of the court. The right to appeal is also subject to the restrictions in sec-
tion 70(2) and (3).
(3) Leave to appeal shall be given only if the court is satisfied -
(a) that the determination of the question will substantially affect the rights of one or more
of the parties,
(b) that the question is one which the tribunal was asked to determine,
(c) that, on the basis of the findings of fact in the award -
(i) the decision of the tribunal on the question is obviously wrong, or
(ii) the question is one of general public importance and the decision of the tribunal is at
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only), 98 New Zealand, Singapore, and British Columbia allow appeal to the
court on questions of law if the court finds that certain conditions have been
met. The most important condition is the court's determination that the ques-
tion of law will substantially affect the rights of one or more of the parties,
or that the point of law is of general public importance. 99
It is true that many countries have adopted some version of the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,20° including Aus-
tralia "(Commonwealth)," Canada (federal), Egypt, Germany, India, Ireland,
and Scotland, which specifically excludes arbitral appeal20 1 by recognizing an
least open to serious doubt, and
(d) that, despite the agreement of the parties to resolve the matter by arbitration, it is just
and proper in all the circumstances for the court to determine the question.
(4) An application for leave to appeal under this section shall identify the question of law to
be determined and state the grounds on which it is alleged that leave to appeal should be
granted.
(5) The court shall determine an application for leave to appeal under this section without a
hearing unless it appears to the court that a hearing is required.
(6) The leave of the court is required for any appeal from a decision of the court under this
section to grant or refuse leave to appeal.
(7) On an appeal under this section the court may by order -
(a) confirm the award,
(b) vary the award,
(c) remit the award to the tribunal, in whole or in part, for reconsideration in the light of the
court's determination, or
(d) set aside the award in whole or in part. The court shall not exercise its power to set
aside an award, in whole or in part, unless it is satisfied that it would be inappropriate to remit
the matters in question to the tribunal for reconsideration.
(8) The decision of the court on an appeal under this section shall be treated as a judgment
of the court for the purposes of a further appeal. But no such appeal lies without the leave of the
court which shall not be given unless the court considers that the question is one of general im-
portance or is one which for some other special reason should be considered by the Court of
Appeal.
197. Section 38 Commercial Arbitration Act for each state and territory.
198. Cap. 341 Arbitration Ordinance, Section 23.
199. See English Arbitration Act 1996, § 69; Commercial Arbitration Act of British Co-
lumbia, Article 31; New Zealand Arbitration Act 1996, Second Schedule, Clause 5; Singapore
Arbitration Act of 2001, Article 49. The BC, Singapore, and New Zealand arbitration acts are
among the acts modeled (at least in part) after the English Arbitration Act of 1996. As the En-
glish Arbitration Act of 1996 was heavily influenced by the Model Law (even if it is much more
detailed than the Model Law-as defined infra note 200), one will also find statements to the ef-
fect that the arbitration acts of those countries are adaptations of the Model Law.
200. Hereinafter referred to as the "Model Law.' UNCITRAL, www.uncitral.org/English/
texts/arbitration/ml-arb.htm (last visited February 11, 2003)(for the text of the Model Law). As of
February 19, 2003, the Model Law had been adopted in 38 countries and five states within the
United States. See www.uncitral.org/English/status/status-e.htm.
201. For a discussion about the history surrounding the decision not to allow arbitral ap-
peal in the Model Law, see infra note 240 and accompanying text.
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"application for setting aside" as the exclusive recourse against an arbitral
award.20 2 Although the Model Law was designed to apply only to interna-
tional commercial arbitration, several countries have adapted the Model Law
so as to apply to both domestic and international arbitration. As a result, sev-
eral countries have ended up with a domestic system that does not recognize
arbitral appeal to the court system as an available option to seek to rectify er-
rors of fact and/or law. The Austrian Zivilprozepordnung and the Dutch
Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering expressly provide for appeal only
to another arbitral tribunal and not to any court.203
E. Allowing Arbitral Appeal is Consistent with Supreme Court Precedents
Insofar as the United Stated is concerned, it is submitted that a public
policy in favor of permitting arbitral appeal by contracting parties is consis-
tent with the public policy view developed by the Supreme Court's decisions
in Moses Cone,2°4 Southland05 and Mitsubishi,2°6 that the FAA regards com-
mercial arbitration as a matter of contract. These cases stand for the view
that,
[als long as the agreement to arbitrate is apparent, and absent overriding reasons external
to the arbitration agreement (rooted either in statutory law or the common law of con-
tracts) justifying judicial reticence to give effect to the unequivocal directive of the FAA
mandating enforcement of arbitration agreements, the parties will be held to their con-
tracts, no matter how objectionable they, or a reviewing court, may find them to be. 207
As the Supreme Court said in Volt, the federal policy under the FAA is
one of "simply ensuring the enforceability, according to their terms, of pri-
vate agreements to arbitrate. '208 Unlike the public policy reasons compelling
us to conclude that the grounds for vacatur set forth in Section 10(a) of the
FAA are mandatory and cannot be deviated from by contract,2°9 there seem to
202. For example, Germany (Book 10, Code of Civil Procedure) and South-Korea (Arbi-
tration Act of Korea (www.kcab.or.krIEnglish/M6/M6S l.asp).
203. § 594(1) ZPO. 1050(l) Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering
204. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. 1.
205. Southland, 465 U.S. 1.
206. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. 614. /
207. Stephen L. Hayford, Commercial Arbitration in the Supreme Court 1983-1995: A Sea
Change, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 11 (1996).
208. Volt, 489 U.S. at 476.
209. See infra notes 254-261 and accompanying text.
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be no convincing "overriding reasons external to the arbitration agreement,"
whether "rooted in statutory law or in the common law of contracts" not to
allow the parties to agree to arbitral appeal. It follows that the Supreme
Court's view of the public policy under the FAA dictates that private agree-
ments to allow appeal of their arbitral awards to the courts need to be en-
forced according to their terms.
The analysis of the Supreme Court's public policy view as developed in
Moses Cone,210 Southland,2 1' and Mitsubishi2 12 might well have lead to a dif-
ferent result without recognition of the difference between vacatur and arbi-
tral appeal. If, as Professor Hayford surmised in a 1996 pre-LaPine analysis
of the Supreme Court's decisions on the subject of the FAA from 1983
through 1995,213 the question of whether to enforce an agreement submitting
the arbitral award to judicial review were to come before the Supreme Court,
and if it were framed as whether the parties can contractually expand the
grounds for vacatur, the Supreme Court's decision would in all likelihood
"limit the grounds for vacatur of commercial arbitration awards to the four
very narrow bases set out in § 10(a) of the Act,' '2 14 and proscribe "contractu-
ally expanded judicial review. ' '21 5 Professor Hayford's prediction may well be
accurate with respect to the grounds for vacatur.
But once a conceptual separation is made between vacatur and arbitral
appeal it becomes clear that the Supreme Court's view of the public policy of
the FAA is consistent both with permitting contractual arbitral appeal and
with limiting the grounds for vacatur to the ones enumerated in § 10(a) of
the FAA. For all the reasons stated, such public policy should clearly honor
an agreement by the parties to subject the arbitral award to an appeal to the
competent court, even if the reviewing court finds the parties' agreement to
submit the award to the review by such court to be unwise or otherwise
objectionable.
F Section 9 of the FAA Does Not Preclude Arbitral Appeal
At least one case has suggested that the language of § 9 of the FAA may
exclude the possibility of arbitral appeal.2 16 In relevant part, § 9 provides that
the court "must" grant an order confirming the arbitral award "unless the
210. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 430 U.S. 1 (1983).
211. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
212. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614.
213. Hayford, supra note 207.
214. Id. at 38.
215. Id.
216. UHC Management Co. v. Computer Sci. Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997 (8 t1 Cir. 1998).
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award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11
of this title".217 If interpreted literally, this language appears to exclude the
possibility of arbitral appeal.
As Professor Cole suggested, however, it is likely that the drafters of the
FAA never contemplated the possibility of a substantive review of an arbitral
award resulting from an arbitral appeal, and simply codified the existing com-
mon law relating to setting aside an award on the grounds of procedural ir-
regularity.218 As Professor Cole noted the 1921 draft of the FAA did not in-
clude any provisions dealing with vacatur, nor was there any discussion of
any other form of judicial review in the legislative history.219 It is therefore
likely that the drafters of the FAA merely intended to codify the relevant
common law which only reviewed arbitral awards for procedural
irregularities.2 0
G. Courts Are Already Reviewing Awards De Novo Based on Non-Statutory
Vacatur Grounds
A contrary policy decision, i.e., that a contractually agreed-upon judicial
review of the arbitrator's award ought not be allowed by our system of arbi-
tration law, would appear to be short-sighted and doctrinaire, especially when
seen in the light of several courts' current practice of reviewing awards on
set-aside applications based on "manifest disregard of the law" and other so-
called non-statutory grounds.
For all intents and purposes, non-statutory grounds for vacatur require a
court to analyze an award in as detailed a manner as when it reviews an
award on appeal. Even if non-statutory vacatur grounds are an unfounded ex-
pansion of the limited grounds enumerated in § 10(a) of the FAA, it would
seem illogical to allow the setting aside of an award on these "marginal re-
views on the merits" (available without the parties' prior agreement) on the
one hand, but not to allow an honest review on the merits when the parties
have expressly empowered a court to do so. 221
For the law to disallow a court to review a contractually agreed upon ar-
bitral appeal, but to permit it for checking whether there was a manifest dis-
217. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2002).
218. See Cole, supra note 113, at 1255.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Hayford, infra note 272, at 834.
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regard of the law, whether the award was "arbitrary or capricious," whether
the award was "completely irrational," or the arbitrator failed in his award to
draw the essence from the parties' contract, rests on a flawed premise.222 It is
flawed in that an award in which the arbitrator unwittingly made an egregious
error of law (or a grossly inaccurate finding of fact) will be good enough for
arbitration and must thus be left standing, - even though the parties had
agreed that the court should review the award -, whereas an award in which
the arbitrator knowingly made an egregious error of law (or grossly inaccu-
rate finding of fact) would be set aisde on the basis of one of these non-
statutory grounds, - even though the parties had not agreed that the court re-
view the award.223 The point is that the arbitrator made the egregious error in
either case, and it does not really matter to the losing party whether he did so
knowingly or unknowingly.
Both standards of review, whether based on arbitral appeal or on any of
these non-statutory vacatur grounds, begin with an assessment of the correct-
ness of the arbitrator's interpretation and application of the relevant law and
both lead to an equally thorough evaluation of the merits of the challenged
award. 224 Not to allow one (appeal), but to allow another (non-statutory
grounds for vacatur) would be both inconsistent and undesirable. This is true
even if this author does not support setting aside an award on the basis of
any of these non-statutory grounds, which is the subject of Section B of Part
VI below.
In conclusion, on the grounds of the doctrines of contractual freedom
and party autonomy, as well as the Supreme Court's doctrine that the FAA
views commercial arbitration as a matter of contract pursuant to which the
Court serves simply to ensure the enforceability of private arbitration agree-
ments in accordance with their terms, the public policy of the United States
should honor an agreement by the parties to subject the arbitral award to an
appeal to the appropriate court.
H. Arbitral Appeal to Another Arbitral Tribunal Cannot Replace Appeal to
the Courts
Of course, a seemingly convenient compromise solution would be to cre-
ate the possibility of appeal not to the court but to another arbitral tribunal
(either for a review of facts the law, or both), which would sacrifice time and
cost, but retain the benefit of confidentiality. It appears that only the Austrian
222. Cf Hayford, supra note 165, at 498-99.
223. Cf. Hayford, infra note 228, 30 GA. L. REV. at 813-14.
224. Id.
200
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arbitration statute explicitly provides for this possibility while prohibiting ar-
bitral appeal to the courts. 25 In addition, it is safe to assume that, consistent
with the doctrine of contractual freedom, the countries that prohibit arbitral
appeal to the courts implicitly allow appeal to another arbitral tribunal. For
example, the Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat provides that,
while the Model Law excludes arbitral appeal in the courts, "a party is not
precluded from resorting to an arbitral tribunal of second instance if such a
possibility has been agreed upon by the parties. ' 226
Judge Posner, in CTU, 27 Judge Mayer in his dissenting opinion in La-
Pine,25 Judge Wollman in UHC Management,229 and Judge Tascha in
Bowen,230 all suggest that if the contracting parties desire broader appellate re-
view, they can contract for an appellate arbitration panel to review the arbi-
trator's award. Apparently, they believe that the possibility of appeal to an-
other arbitral panel solves the parties' desire to have an arbitral appeal, and
serves the public interest because these parties will not be bothering the court
system.
Of course, there is no statistical information indicating how many con-
tracting parties in the Seventh and Tenth Circuits (who are aware that these
Circuits do not permit arbitral appeal to the courts) decide against an arbitra-
tion clause altogether; opting instead to litigate any disputes arising from the
agreement or the breach thereof in the courts. This increases the burden on
the court system rather than diminishes it.
Even if the option of arbitral appeal to another panel of arbitrators has
merit and may be a good idea for contracting parties to adopt in the right cir-
cumstances, it cannot be said that, simply because this option is available to
the contracting parties, the law ought to prohibit arbitral appeal to the courts.
Instead, the public policy considerations in support of arbitral appeal to the
225. See § 594(1) ZPO. See also, JAMS Comprehensive Rules, Rule 34.
226. Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, Para. 41, available at http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/arbitration/ml-
arb.htm last visited on Feb. 11, 2003.
227. Chi. Typographic Union v. Chi. Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1504-05 (7th Cir.
1991); see also supra note 69 and accompanying text.
228. LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Mayer, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Judge Posner's decision in Chi. Typographical Union).
229. UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Sci. Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 998 (81h Cir. 1998); see also
supra note 25 and accompanying text.
230. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 934 (101h Cir. 2001).
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courts set forth above23' remain unaltered. The importance of the parties' au-
tonomy simply outweighs the fact that certain scholars (as well as certain
contracting parties) may prefer appeal to another arbitral tribunal.
The possibility that parties may agree to submit their arbitral award to
review by an arbitral appeals panel is not one of those "overriding reasons
external to the arbitration agreement, which is rooted either in statutory law
or the common law of contracts" justifying judicial reluctance to implement
the clear directive of the FAA to enforce arbitration agreements.232 The parties
ought to be held to their contracts, no matter how objectionable they, or a re-
viewing court, may find those contracts to be. Absent any "overriding rea-
sons," the autonomy needs to be respected.
VI. THERE IS ROOM FOR ARBITRAL APPEAL IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION
A. The Arguments in Favor
Many commentators believe that there is no place for arbitral appeal in
international commercial arbitration.233 For example, Professor Smit argues,
"it is the universally accepted rule that arbitral awards may not be reviewed
on alleged errors of fact or law."'2 34 Indeed, as noted previously,2 35 under the
Model Law, which is intended to apply to international commercial arbitra-
tion, the only recourse against an award is an Application for Setting
Aside,2 36 on grounds that are similar to those set forth in Article V(I) of the
New York Convention. 237 Also, the French Nouveau code de procidure civile
distinguishes238 between domestic and non-domestic arbitration law, allowing
arbitral appeal in domestic arbitration,2 39 but not in international arbitration.2 40
231. See discussion supra notes 175-190.
232. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
233. See generally supra note 114; see also Richmond Symposium, supra note 151, at 6-7.
234. See Smit, supra note 114, at 149.
235. See supra, notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
236. Model Law, Art. 34.
237. See Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat, following the text of the Model
Law, website supra note 200, at 16, 24-25. See also Marianne Roth & Tobias Brinkmann, supra
note 192, 5 Croat. Arbit. Yearb. at 68 (1998).
238. Art. 1492 of the Nouveau code de procedure civile ("NCPC") simply provides that
arbitration is international which concerns international commercial interests. ("Est international
l'arbitrage qui met en cause des int6r~ts du commerce international.")
239. See Art. 1482 et seq. of the NCPC. The parties can "opt out" of the possibility of
appeal. Arbitral appeal is generally not available if the arbitrator(s) sit as "amiable(s) com-
positeur(s)," i.e. when the arbitrators may ignore the law and decide the dispute on equitable
grounds.
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The decision to eliminate the possibility of appeal against awards from
the Model Law was not without controversy. Notably, the delegation for the
United Kingdom pointed out that "[w]hilst thoroughly understanding the
point of view that the parties should not be compelled to submit to recourse
on questions of law, the United Kingdom suggests that the logical conse-
quence of party autonomy is that they should be allowed to have recourse, if
that is what they have agreed."'2 41 It will not go unnoticed that this is the very
same argument used by proponents of arbitral appeal in domestic arbitration.
As many commentators before him, Professor Park argues in favor of
separate regimes for domestic and international arbitration, but it appears that
in his elaboration Professor Park distinguishes not between domestic and in-
ternational commercial arbitration, but between "consumer sales, employment
contracts and international commercial transactions. 2 42 It is true that the cate-
gories of consumer sales, employment and commercial transactions each re-
quire different regimes. Domestic and international commercial transactions,
however, do not seem to require different regimes except in certain procedu-
ral respects, such as are provided in Articles 85 through 88 of the English
Arbitration Act of 1996.243
Professor Park further argues that a "more neutral playing field" is
needed in cross-border litigation, "where the perception of judicial bias can
cause productive transactions to falter."' 244 Isn't avoiding the perception of ju-
dicial bias, or any form of bias for that matter, equally important for domestic
litigation?
It has become more, rather than less, fashionable in international arbitra-
tion circles to take the view that international arbitration has so many distinct
requirements that it demands a separate regime. The arguments in favor of ar-
240. See Art. 1502 et seq. NCPC. See generally Laurence Franc, Contractual Modification
of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards: The French Position, 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 215 (1999).
241. See F. Davidson, The New Arbitration Act - A Model Law?, 1997 J. Bus. L. 101,
125.
242. William W. Park, Why Courts Review Arbitral Awards, 2 INT'L ARB Q .LREv. 121,
128 (2001).
243. See English Arbitration Act, supra note 164. Provisions domestic arbitration.
244. See id. (Art. 1717 (4) Code Judiciaire, discussed supra at notes 185-186 and 199,
compelled Professor Park to list Belgium as one of the countries having a different regime for
domestic and international arbitration. The mere fact that this provision creates the possibility for
parties who have no connection with Belgium whatsoever, to renounce all forms of judicial re-
view, including vacatur proceedings, does not seem to establish a separate regime for interna-
tional arbitration.
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bitral appeal in domestic commercial arbitration appear to be the same as
those in favor of the arbitral appeal in international commercial arbitration.
LaPine2 45 involved an international commercial dispute, and is a clear exam-
ple of the cases in which so much money is involved that the possibility of
additional review by the courts makes a lot of sense to those whose money is
at stake.
Also, an arbitration clause with the right to appeal to the courts may
well be the result of a compromise between negotiating parties where at the
outset of the negotiations one party was in favor of arbitration while the other
preferred the courts. Those situations are no different whether it concerns do-
mestic or international commercial arbitration.
B. How Frequently Will Parties Use A Clause Providing For Arbitral
Appeal?
If parties should be "allowed recourse" to the courts, as the UK delega-
tion to UNCITRAL suggested, and as is largely provided by Section 69 of
the English Arbitration Act of 1996,246 for both domestic and international ar-
bitration, how often will parties avail themselves of this opportunity? As far
can be determined, the fear voiced by Professor Taniguchi2 47 that if we sup-
port LaPine "we must be prepared to accept the situation that every arbitra-
tion agreement has a clause for judicial review on the merits" is not borne
out by the experience in countries that explicitly allow arbitral appeal.
However, Richard Johnston shared a different view, when he said that,
[iln all likelihood, most parties will continue to arbitrate [without a provision allowing for
arbitral appeal] for the reasons that have led to development of the arbitration system:
they prefer faster resolution of disputes without the labyrinthine appeal process that often
accompanies litigation. Only in rare and unusual circumstances will the parties to a con-
tract agree to the LaPine-type review. 248
The experience under Section 69 of the new English Arbitration Act was ex-
pected to be the same, at least with respect to international arbitration. 49
245. LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 E3'd 884 (91h Cir. 1997). For the amounts
at stake, see supra note 73. For an extensive historical account of the facts of this case, see also
Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc., 299 E3d 769 (91' Cir. 2002).
246. See English Arbitration Act, Supra note 164.
247. Prof. Yasuhei Taniguchi, Introduction, in Richmond Symposium, supra note 151, at 1,
5. Similar fears were expressed by Stephen K. Huber & E. Wendy Trachte-Huber, International
ADR in the 1990's: The Top Ten Developments, 1. Hous. Bus. & TAX. L.J. 184, 206 (2001) and
Younger, supra note 113, at 261.
248. Johnston, supra note 151, at 8.
249. See Roth & Tobias, supra note 192, at 67 n.95: "It is expected that at least in inter-
national arbitration the opportunity to exclude judicial review of the dispute's merits will be fre-
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C. What Exactly Is International Arbitration?
There is an additional argument for not making the distinction between
domestic and international commercial arbitration: what exactly constitutes in-
ternational arbitration as opposed to domestic arbitration? 2 0 Clearly, when the
parties to the agreement have different nationalities or reside in different
countries, the arbitration is international. But what about the arbitration con-
cerning a property in country A that is between two parties both from country
B? What about the branch office in Country A of a bank from Country B, ar-
bitrating a dispute with a customer in Country A? What about a tri-partite
agreement 251, where two parties are from Country A and the third party is
from Country B, where the main dispute arose between the two parties from
Country A? If that started out as a domestic dispute between the first two
parties, does it suddenly become international when the party from Country B
joins in the proceedings? Should the dispute between the two parties from
Country A be governed by the rules applying to domestic arbitration while
the dispute with the party from Country B is controlled by the rules applying
to international arbitration? 252
quently used." [Emphasis added]. But see Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, supra note 109. In
Comment B to Section 23 it is noted that the Drafting Committee, after extensive deliberation,
decided not to include an "Opt-In" provision principally because it "might lead to the routine
inclusion of review provisions in arbitration agreements in order to assuage the concerns of par-
ties uncomfortable with the risk of being stuck with disagreeable arbitration awards that are im-
mune from judicial review."
250. See supra note 238 for the French example of drawing the distinction between do-
mestic and international arbitration. Art. 1(3) of the Model Law is more encompassing but would
appear to invite litigation as well:
3) An arbitration is international if: (a) the parties to an arbitration agreement have, at the
time of the conclusion of that agreement, their places of business in different States; or
(b) one of the following places is situated outside the State in which the parties have their
places of business: (i) the place of arbitration if determined in, or pursuant to, the arbitra-
tion agreement; (ii) any place where a substantial part of the obligations of the commer-
cial relationship is to be performed or the place with which the subject-matter of the dis-
pute is most closely connected; or (c) the parties have expressly agreed that the subject-
matter of the arbitration agreement relates to more than one country.
251. Such as the agreement at issue in LaPine, which was among two US companies, La-
Pine and Prudential-Bache Trade Services (PBTC), and a Japanese company, Kyocera. See supra
note 245.
252. This is an issue that may well go beyond the difficulties in interpreting Section 202
FAA, which excludes from the scope of the New York Convention agreements entirely between
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In other words, it is not always easy to make the distinction between do-
mestic and international arbitration. So why adopt two different systems if
there do not seem to be sufficiently compelling reasons?
It should be noted that the English Arbitration Act of 1996 may well
have found a way around the difficulty of defining what constitutes interna-
tional arbitration: Rather than defining what is international arbitration, in Ar-
ticle 85 (2), the Act defines a domestic arbitration agreement as an agreement
to which none of the parties is an individual who is either a national or resi-
dent of, or a body corporate which is incorporated in, or whose central con-
trol and management is exercised in, a state other than the United Kingdom,
and under which agreement the seat of arbitration is designated to be the
United Kingdom. 5 3
Unless someone comes forward with a cogent reason to deviate from the
policy in favor of arbitral appeal, apart from providing for the obvious provi-
sions required to regulate the applicability of the New York Convention and
perhaps certain other procedural issues, it is submitted that international com-
mercial arbitration should not be treated any differently than domestic
arbitration.
VII. THE GROUNDS FOR VACATUR
A. The Right To Challenge An Award Pursuant To §§lO(a)(1) - (4) of the
FAA Is Mandatory And Non-Waivable.
Armed with an awareness of the profound difference between arbitral ap-
peal on the one hand, and "challenges" under § 10(a) of FAA on the other, it
becomes clear that the grounds for vacatur set forth in § 10(a) need to be
treated as provisions of mandatory law that cannot be contracted away by the
parties. Just as the grounds to set aside a judgment are inherent in the public
U.S. citizens unless the relationship involves property located abroad or envisages performance or
enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states. Sec-
tion 202 FAA is discussed in detail by Susan L. Karamanian, The Road to the Tribunal and Be-
yond: International Commercial Arbitration and United States Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REV. 17, 35-36 (2002).
253. Art. 85 (2) English Arbitration Act of 1996. Articles 85 through 88 start of Part II of
the Act, entitled "Other Provisions Related to Arbitration", and provide how the provisions of
Part I are modified in the case of a domestic arbitration agreement. It should be noted, of course,
that the English Arbitration Act does not have separate regimes for international and domestic ar-
bitration, so that it needs only a few provisions to deal with certain special circumstances
presented by purely domestic cases. One of the modifications it provides for is that exclusion
agreements relating to Sections 45 (determination of preliminary point of law) and 69 (arbitral
appeal on point of law) are not effective unless entered into after the commencement of the arbi-
tral proceedings. Art. 87 (I) English Arbitration Act of 1996.
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policy of ensuring the integrity and trustworthiness of the judicial system, so
must the grounds for setting aside an arbitral award be deemed to be a matter
of public policy of ensuring the integrity of the arbitral system2 54 as con-
ducted in the United States. 255
Similarly, Article 68 of the English Arbitration Act of 1996 (setting forth
the grounds for setting aside an award under English law) is mandatory pur-
suant to Art. 4(1) and Schedule I, which lists all provisions in the Act that
are mandatory. The Act is based on the non-waivable opportunity to seek ju-
dicial review of an arbitration's fundamental procedural regularity.256
The view that the grounds for vacatur set forth in § 10(a)(1)-(4) of the
FAA are mandatory and non-waivable is consistent with the existing case law
254. Cf Prof. Park's assessment of the new English Arbitration Act of 1996 noting that
"[tlhe basic principle of party autonomy is supplemented by both reasonable default rules and
mandatory safeguards for procedural integrity, in a way that will command the esteem of any
thoughtful critic." William W. Park, The New English Arbitration Act, 13 Mealey's Int'l Arb.
Rep. No. 6, Conclusion (Emphasis added).
255. This proposition has another important implication that cannot be ignored: if, the
standards set forth in Section 10(a) are indeed mandatory and non-waivable, the Supreme Court's
decision in Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468
(1989) needs to be construed so as not to apply to the mandatory provisions of the FAA. The
court in Volt held, with respect to a case involving a motion to compel arbitration under either §§
3 or 4 of the FAA or under CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282.2, that although federal law pre-empts
state law with respect to all commercial arbitration agreements, the FAA's primary purpose is to
ensure that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms, even if this re-
sults in an arbitration conducted in a manner inconsistent with the substantive law of commercial
arbitration as set out in the FAA. Construing Volt so that it does not apply to the mandatory pro-
visions of the FAA will prevent contractual choice-of-law provisions applying state arbitration
laws that would result in making Section 10 FAA inapplicable to the award in question. Such a
construction of Volt would be consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984) (holding that the FAA's "substantive provisions-§§ 1 and 2-are
applicable in state as well as federal court .... " 489 U.S. at 477 n.6. See also Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270-72 (1995); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983), n.32 and accompanying text; Bowen v. Amoco
Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, at 931 (101h Cir. 2001) ("Although the FAA does not create indepen-
dent federal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has held that the Act creates a body of substantive
federal law governing arbitration agreements within its coverage." (Citations omitted)).
256. Park, supra note 254. See also § 598(1) ZPO (Austria) which provides, inter alia,
that the provision dealing with challenging the award (§ 595 ZPO) is mandatory and cannot be
waived. As Professor Park notes correctly, in the United States there is "one American decision
that suggests in an ill-reasoned dictum that parties could 'opt out of the FAA's off-the-rack vaca-
tur standards."' Roadway Package System, Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2001). See also,
William W. Park, Why Courts Review Arbitral Awards, 2 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. Q. L.REV. 121,
131 n.ll (2001).
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holding that, despite the contractual provision that the award shall be "bind-
ing, final and non-appealable," judicial review of such award is permissible
on the grounds set forth in the FAA.257
In the same vein, the defenses set forth in Article V(1) of the New York
Convention258 cannot be waived by agreement between the parties and consti-
tute mandatory law.25 9 In the case of an arbitration held under the Rules of
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),260 the right to assert the de-
fenses to enforcement of awards in the New York Convention under Article
V(l) were held to remain available to parties who are unsuccessful in arbitra-
tion proceedings, in spite of language of Article 28(6) of the ICC Rules of
Arbitration that the parties are deemed "to have waived their right to any
form of recourse insofar as such waiver can validly be made."' 26'
Contrary to the laws of most foreign nations, there are at least three
countries where the parties can waive a mandatory minimum of judicial scru-
tiny. As Professor Varady points out, Article 192(1) of the Swiss Private In-
ternational Law Act provides that the parties may expressly agree to exclude
all vacatur proceedings, or may limit such challenges to one or several of the
grounds listed in Article 190 of the same Act.2 62 Essentially the same solution
is adopted in Article 78(6) of the Tunisian Arbitration Code of 1993.263 As
Professor Varady points out, however, this is possible only when none of the
parties has its domicile, habitual residence, or business establishment in Swit-
257. Team Scandia, Inc. v. Greco, 6 F. Supp. 2d 795, 798 (S.D. Ind. 1998); See also,
Tabas v. Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280, 1288 (3d Cir. 1995).
258. Reference herein to the "New York Convention" is to the Convention on the Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S.
38, which as of this writing has been adopted by 132 countries. The New York Convention was
ratified by the United States in 1970, and is implemented by, and incorporated into, Chapter 2 of
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C.A. § I et seq., at §§ 201-208. It should be noted that
Article V(I) of the New York Convention does not set forth grounds for vacatur but rather
grounds for refusing confirmation of a foreign award. See Karamanian, supra note 252, at 99.
259. Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1992), and cases cited
therein. The court opined: "The terms 'final' and 'binding' merely reflect a contractual intent
that the issues joined and resolved in the arbitration may not be tried de novo in any court. (Cita-
tions omitted.) Furthermore, we have held that even a 'final' and 'binding' arbitral award is sub-
ject to the defenses to enforcement provided for in the New York Convention." (Citations
omitted).
260. M&C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., 87 F.3d 844, 847 (6th Cir. 1996) (Citations
omitted).
261. Supra note 49.
262. See Richmond Symposium, supra note 151, at 17 for Professor Tibor Varady's
remarks.
263. Article 78(6) Code de l'arbitrage, Chapitre III: de larbitrage international. The
French text of the Tunisian Arbitration Code can be found at www.tgisbserver.com/arbitrage/.
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zerland (or Tunisia, as the case may be).264
A similar rule was adopted in 1998 in Belgium, by an amendment of
Article 1717 of the Code Judiciaire adding a paragraph (4) allowing the con-
tracting parties, by an express and unambiguous declaration in their arbitra-
tion agreement, to opt out of all annulment proceedings.265 This provision is,
however, subject to the same proviso, that the parties are neither Belgian citi-
zens nor residents, or, as to legal entities, that they have neither their regis-
tered office nor a branch office in Belgium. It is at least plausible that the
legislatures of the countries in question found that when these conditions are
present, there is no national public policy interest justifying a rule that is non-
waivable. In contrast, the vacatur proceedings in these three countries.are
mandatory and non-waivable if any one party is a national, resident, or com-
pany (or branch) of or in the country concerned.2 66
The manner in which these three countries provide for this narrow possi-
bility of limiting or waiving the right to challenge the arbitral award on tradi-
tional vacatur grounds supports the view that, whenever the public policy of
any country, such as the United States, does apply (because one or more of
the parties is a citizen or resident), its laws should provide that such vacatur
grounds are in fact mandatory and non-waivable.
Not making the fundamental distinction between vacatur and arbitral ap-
peal can lead to a false analysis, such as the one propounded by Professor
Cole when she suggests that "[i]f FAA 10(a) establishes a mandatory rule,
the parties' agreement to expand judicial review beyond section 10(a) must be
rejected because the court does not have the power to enforce it."'2 67 Obvi-
ously, Professor Cole's suggestion is true only if arbitral appeal and vacatur
are the same thing. However, once it is seen that they are two unrelated con-
264. Id.
265. As amended by the Act of May 19, 1998, effective August 17, 1998.
266. Art. 1717 Code Judiciaire / Gerechtelijk Wetboek (Belgium); Article 78(6) Code de
l'arbitrage, Chapitre III: de l'arbitrage international (Tunisia); Art. 192 (2) Loi fddgrale sur le
droit international privd (Switzerland).
267. Cole, supra note 113, at 1251. Professor Cole argues that the language of Section
10(a) FAA, that a federal court "may" vacate an award upon any party's application on the
grounds enumerated therein, suggests that the court's action is not mandatory. In this author's
opinion, the word "may" is probably not meant to give discretion but rather simply meant to au-
thorize the court to vacate the arbitral award. Even if the language of Section 10(a) intends to
confer discretionary authority on the court, this does not mean that it becomes waivable and non-
mandatory as between the contracting/litigating parties.
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cepts, so that § 10(a) has nothing to do with the question of whether the law
allows arbitral appeal, § 10(a) can be analyzed standing on its own.
For reasons of domestic case law, by analogy to the laws of many other
countries, and on public policy grounds, the right to challenge an arbitral
award on the grounds of § 10(a) FAA must be mandatory and unwaivable.
B. The Supreme Court Needs To Invalidate Non-Statutory Grounds for
Vacatur
Once the decision has been made to allow contractually agreed-upon ar-
bitral appeal as part of a system that is compatible with the basic public pol-
icy created by the FAA, it is submitted that the Supreme Court can, and
should, do away with the non-statutory grounds for vacatur developed by
most of the circuit courts of appeals 268 and hold that § 10(a) of the FAA pro-
vides the exclusive grounds upon which an arbitral award can be challenged
and, if appropriate, set aside.
In developing the non-statutory vacatur grounds, most lower courts have
relied on what Professor Smit called "an unfortunate Supreme Court dic-
tum"' 269 in the 1953 case, Wilko v. Swan.270 In general, non-statutory vacatur
grounds have shown to have limited practical use and to easily provide a
back-door delay tactic for the losing party.
As previously stated, the circuit courts of appeals adopting non-statutory
grounds for vacatur have entertained the possibility of vacating an award if it
would: (1) be in "manifest disregard of the law," (2) be in direct conflict
with "public policy," (3) be "arbitrary and capricious," (4) be "completely
irrational," or (5) "fail to draw its essence" from the parties' underlying con-
tract.271 In his lengthy 1996 article, Professor Stephen L. Hayford made a
thorough analysis of the jurisprudence of the federal courts, and concluded
268. Accord as to "manifest disregard of the applicable law," Smit, supra note 114, at
148.
269. Id.
270. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-437 (1953) (overruled on other grounds in Rodri-
guez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)). It could be argued, as
did the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 759
(5th Cir. 1999), that the Wilko dictum was recognized (albeit again in dictum) by the Supreme
Court in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995), when Justice Breyer
wrote: "The party still can ask a court to review the arbitrator's decision, but the court will set
that decision aside only in very unusual circumstances. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 10 (award procured
by corruption, fraud, or undue means; arbitrator exceeded his powers); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.
427, 436-37 (1953) (parties bound by arbitrator's decision not in "manifest disregard" of the
law), overruled on other grounds, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477 (1989)."
271. Hayford, supra note 165, at 461-62.
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that there is much confusion as to which non-statutory vacatur grounds are
available, and when.2 2 He found that only the Fourth Circuit has "unequivo-
cally rejected the nonstatutory grounds for vacatur," whereas four circuit
courts of appeals could be described as being in a "state of extreme confu-
sion" with regard to the non-statutory grounds for vacatur, namely the Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits.273 The remaining circuit courts of appeals
"have clearly recognized" at least one non-statutory ground for vacatur.2 4 A
cursory review of the federal cases decided since Professor Hayford's article
appears to indicate that little has changed. 275
In his 1998 article, Professor Hayford concluded correctly that "[t]he
law of vacatur must be stabilized and made uniform across jurisdictions by
returning it to the unequivocal standards articulated in section 10(a) of the
FAA."' 276 Professor Hayford made a possible exception for the "manifest dis-
regard of the law" and "public policy" grounds if narrowly construed in the
manner he advocates. 277 In this author's opinion, it would be neither necessary
nor desirable to save even those if the parties could choose to submit their
award to appeal.
Abolishing the non-statutory grounds for vacatur is supported by the
wording of § 9 of the FAA, 278 when it provides that, upon timely application
by any party, the court must grant an order confirming the arbitral award
"unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections
10 and 11 of this title. '2 79 It would seem fair to attach this consequence of
the language used in § 9 to non-statutory grounds for vacatur, at least insofar
as such non-statutory grounds are procedural in nature.280
272. Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial
Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REv. 731 (1996); See also Hayford supra note 165 for a subse-
quent article concerning the same topic.
273. Hayford supra note 272, at 764.
274. Id. at 774.
275. See, e.g., Crye-Leike, Inc. v. Thomas, 196 F. Supp. 2d 680 (W.D. Tenn. 2002); Co-
lumbia Med. Ctr. of Lewisville, Subsidiary L.P. v. Heller, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2069 (N.D.
Tex. 2001).
276. Hayford, supra note 165, at 504.
277. Id. at 504..
278. See supra notes 216-220 and accompanying text.
279. UFC Management, 148 F.3d at 997.
280. Therefore, There may be some question as to whether this is a fair and intended con-
sequence with respect to Section 10(a)(4) which, according to most scholars, is more substantive
in nature, See, e.g. Younger, supra note 113, at 243-244.
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There is broad support in foreign statutes for the view that the list of
statutory vacatur grounds of § 10(a) FAA needs to be viewed as exclusive.
For example, Article 34 of the Model Law,28' adopted by approximately 35
countries, provides an exclusive list of limited grounds for setting aside an ar-
bitral award. 282 Also, Article 1704 of the Belgian Code Judiciaire,283 Article
1484 of the French New Code of Civil Procedure214 and Article 1065 of the
Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure, 285 all provide exclusive lists of the
grounds on which an arbitral award can be set aside.
A distinction needs to be made between (i) the willingness to restrict ju-
dicial review on the basis of a set-aside application (and therefore not based
upon a prior agreement between the parties) to a system limited to
mandatory, non-waivable statutory grounds, and (ii) a certain dissatisfaction
with the grounds as available pursuant to § 10(a) FAA. Both Section 23(a) of
the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act286 and Section 68(2) of the English Ar-
bitration Act of 1996287 provide for a more extensive list of grounds on which
an award can be set aside, and, in a new incarnation of the FAA, a list of
grounds similar to either of them (but especially Section 68(2)) would be
more desirable.
VIII. PurrING IT ALL TOGETHER INTO ONE LOGICAL SYSTEM
Combining the possibility of contractually agreed upon arbitral appeal
with a clear rule limiting the remedies for setting aside an arbitral award to
the grounds enumerated in § 10(a) of the FAA leads to a logical, cohesive
system that will create more legal certainty. Additionally, implementing this
system would have some other interesting ramifications.
A. A Clear Choice
Adopting the system of allowing arbitral appeal while abolishing all non-
statutory vacatur grounds would create a clear choice for the contracting par-
ties. The parties would be able to weigh whether or not to include arbitral ap-
281. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 200.
282. See Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat, supra note 226, at 42.
283. For an English translation of the part of the Code Judiciaire dealing with arbitration,
see http://www.cepani.be/bodyjlegislationen.html last visited on Feb. 11, 2003.
284. An English translation of the Nouveau Code De Procidure Civile can be found at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/htmllcodestraduits/somncpca. htm last visited on Feb. 11, 2003.
285. Art. 1065(1) Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering.
286. The text of the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act may be found at
www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uarba/arbitratl2l3.htm last visited on Feb. 11, 2003.
287. Supra note 192.
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peal in their agreement. The parties will choose in favor of arbitral appeal if
they feel it is important to obtain an accurate and correct result,288 and are
willing to sacrifice the benefits of a confidential, relatively speedy, and cost-
efficient process.
On the other hand, if they find it important that the proceedings remain
confidential, the award be truly final, and the costs of the proceedings be rel-
atively contained, they will choose not to include an appeal provision (or to
provide for appeal to another panel of arbitrators). In that event, they will be
assured that the "back-door" is not available to the losing party, which
would remove all the advantages of arbitration without appeal just mentioned.
As Judge Posner observed with respect to the non-statutory vacatur ground of
manifest disregard of the law, "if it is meant to smuggle review for clear er-
ror in by the back door, it is inconsistent with the entire modem law of
arbitration." 289
Finally, the clear choice offered by this cohesive system will come as
close as practically possible to relieving the tension between the desire for a
relatively expeditious procedure resulting in a final and binding award, and
the uneasiness about the absence of quality control over arbitrators who are
asked to interpret increasingly complicated areas of the law in disputes which
prior to the Supreme Court's recent line of cases, were not considered to be
arbitrable.
B. Reasoned Awards Will No Longer Be Exposed To Unnecessary Challenges
For the reasons stated by Professor Hayford, a requirement that the
award includes findings of fact and conclusions of law would further perfect
such a system.290 The statutory grounds for vacatur, when correctly inter-
preted and applied, present no disincentive to substantive reasoned awards. 291
288. For example, because the issues are perceived to be legally complex, the economic
interests involved are, or are expected to be, very substantial. In LaPine, the ultimate judgment in
favor of claimants LaPine and PBTS exceeded $430 million. See, "$3 Million in Attorneys' Fees
Awarded To LaPine Technology, Prudential-Bache Trade Services, " 16 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB.
Rep. No. 7 (July 2001).
289. Bavarati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7Th Cir. 1994).
290. Hayford, supra note 165.
291. It goes beyond the scope of this article to give a detailed account of the case law re-
lating to the application of Section 10(a) FAA. Professor Hayford gives an excellent analysis of
the case law that interprets the narrow circumstances in which the courts have reviewed awards
under the four grounds of Section 10(a). See Hayford, supra note 273. See also, Hayford, supra
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As Professor Hayford suggests, § 10(a) of the FAA ensures effective enforce-
ment of agreements to arbitrate, and is therefore consistent with the FAA's
primary goal of enforcing the arbitral agreement in accordance with its terms.
Under the first three grounds of § 10(a) a reasoned award will be va-
cated only if the party challenging the award can show indisputably that (a)
one or more proscribed types of party, attorney, or arbitrator misconduct has
occurred and (b) the proved misconduct influenced or persuaded the arbitra-
tor's decision on the merits. Under § 10(a)(4) a reasoned award will be va-
cated only if the party challenging the award demonstrates that, in deciding
the controversy before him, the arbitrator either decided an issue not included
in the parties' submission to arbitration, or in some other way exercised an
authority not delegated to him by the parties' underlying agreement to
arbitrate.2 92
As Professor Hayford concluded, "[w]ell thought-out, reasoned awards
that consistently demonstrate to the parties . . . the manner in which arbitra-
tors decided their disputes are the most effective and efficient device for as-
suring that competent decisions and accurate, correct results are achieved."2 93
By doing away with the non-statutory grounds for vacatur, the perceived risk
that reasoned awards are in danger of being vacated would be eliminated.
The arbitration statutes of many countries294 require reasoned awards (for
the most part, unless the parties agree to the contrary), and the FAA should
do the same. Similarly, Article 25(2) of the ICC Rules of Arbitration requires
that the award "state the reasons upon which it is based."2 95 The United
States thus appears to be one of the few industrialized nations where arbitral
awards without any findings of fact and conclusions of law are commonplace.
note 165, at 450-61.
292. Hayford, supra note 143 at 461.
293. Id. at 506.
294. See, e.g., Art. 31(2) Model Law, supra note 199; Art. 52(4) English Arbitration Act
1996; Art. 32(2) Ley 36/1988, de 5 Diciembre, De Arbitraje (Spain); Art. 823(3) Codice di
Procedura Civile (Titolo VIII - dell'Arbitro) (Italy); Art. 1471 Code de Procddure Civile (France);
Art. 1701 Code Judiciaire (Belgium); Art. 1057(4)(e) Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering
(The Netherlands).
295. See also Art. 29(2) Mediation and Arbitration Rules of the Commercial Arbitration
and Mediation Ctr. for the Americas (1996); Art. 27(2) Int'l Arbitration Rules of the Am. Arbi-
tration Assoc. (1997); Art. 26.1 LCIA Rules (London Ct. of Int'l Arbitration) (1998); Rule 14.2
CPR Rules for Int'l Non-Administered Arbitration; Art. 32(3) UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
(Gen. Assembly Resolution 31/98); Art. 32(4) Rules of the Ctr. for Int'l Commercial Arbitration.
In contradistinction, Rule R-44 of the (often used) Commercial Dispute Resolution Procedures of
the American Arbitration Association provides that "[tlhe arbitrator need not render a reasoned
award unless the parties request such an award in writing prior to the appointment of the arbitra-
tor or unless the arbitrator determines that a reasoned award is appropriate."
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A general statutory requirement that awards must include findings of fact
and a reasoned analysis followed by conclusions of law would also hopefully
eliminate anomalies such as Sobel v. Hertz Warner & Co.,296 in which the ap-
peals court felt compelled to overturn the District Court's order remanding the
proceeding to the arbitrators for explanation of their decision dismissing a
claim against a brokerage firm. 297 The court remanded even though, of the
two brokers involved, one plead guilty, and the other had been found guilty
of, conspiracy charges relating to similar prohibited transactions involving the
very same stock.
C. Rules for Consumer Arbitration Will Need to be Updated
Although this article is limited to a discussion of arbitral appeal and va-
catur in commercial arbitration, there is an implication of abolishing the non-
statutory vacatur grounds for consumer arbitration298 that merits separate dis-
cussion. How would the Supreme Court's invalidating the non-statutory vaca-
296. 469 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972).
297. Id.
298. The Cal. Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitration, which
became effective on July 1, 2002, define "consumer arbitration" as follows:
(d) "Consumer arbitration" means an arbitration conducted under a predispute arbitration
provision contained in a contract that meets the criteria listed in paragraphs (1) through (3) be-
low. "Consumer arbitration" excludes arbitration proceedings conducted under or arising out of
public or private sector labor-relations laws, regulations, charter provisions, ordinances, statutes,
or agreements.
(1) The contract is with a consumer party, as defined in these standards;
(2) The contract was drafted by or on behalf of the nonconsumer party; and
(3) The consumer party was required to accept the arbitration provision in the contract.
The words "Consumer party" are defined in the next subsection, as follows:
(e) "Consumer party" is a party to an arbitration agreement who, in the context of that arbi-
tration agreement, is any of the following: (1) An individual who seeks or acquires, including by
lease, any goods or services primarily for personal, family, or household purposes including, but
not limited to, financial services, insurance, and other goods and services as defined in section
1761 of the Civil Code; (2) An individual who is an enrollee, a subscriber, or insured in a
health-care service plan within the meaning of section 1345 of the Health and Safety Code or
health-care insurance plan within the meaning of section 106 of the Insurance Code; (3) An indi-
vidual with a medical malpractice claim that is subject to the arbitration agreement; or (4) An
employee or an applicant for employment in a dispute arising out of or relating to the employee's
employment or the applicant's prospective employment that is subject to the arbitration
agreement.
Division VI, Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitration, at http://
www.courtinfo.ca.gov/rules/2002/appendixlappdiv6.pdf.
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tur grounds affect the arbitration clauses we find in adhesion contracts? It
may be recalled that, at least insofar as mandatory employment arbitration
agreements are concerned, the California landscape changed substantially
since the California Supreme Court's decision in Armendariz v. Foundation
Health Psychcare Services, Inc.299
In essence, Armendariz laid down the conditions with which arbitration
clauses in adhesion contracts must comply so they are not held to be uncon-
scionable under the general California law on adhesion contracts. One of
these conditions requires a written, reasoned opinion by the arbitrator, which
would allow at least a minimum form of judicial review. This is consistent
with the discussion herein favoring reasoned awards, The Armendariz Court
deemed judicial review based on the non-statutory vacatur grounds of "mani-
fest disregard of the law" or "public policy" to be adequate.3°° As Professor
Smit already pointed out, manifest disregard can find application in only the
most exceptional circumstances. For an award to be set aside on this ground,
current case law requires that the moving party show both that the arbitrator
knew what the applicable law was and that he willfully disregarded such
law.10' Professor Smit correctly stated:
[i]t would truly take an unusually incompetent arbitrator to acknowledge in the award that
he knew what the applicable law was, but decided to disregard it. Even an only moder-
ately skilled arbitrator will know how to avoid this trap by finding that the applicable law
is what he wants it to be. As long as he does that, he cannot be found to have willfully
disregarded the applicable law." 2
Reported case law indicates that a challenge of the award based on
"manifest disregard" is therefore rarely successful and must be seen as more
symbolic than having real practical meaning.0 3 The same conclusions can be
drawn with respect to the "public policy" ground for setting aside an arbitral
award. 0n
299. 24 Cal.415 83 (2000), (following Cole v. Burns Int'l Security Scvs, 105 F.3d 1465
(D.C. Cir. 1997), a case that actually upheld the mandatory employment arbitration agreement at
issue.) Armendariz was in turn followed by the 91h Circuit's decision in Circuit City Stores v. Ad-
ams, 279 F.3d 889 (90 Cir. 2002), on remand from 532 US 105 (2001).
300. Cole, 105 E3d at 1486-87, Armendariz, 224 Cal.41h at 106-07.
301. See Hayford, infra note 228, 30 GA. L. REv. at 816.
302. Smit, supra note 114, at 148.
303. Accord Smit, supra note 114, at 148. See also, Hayford, supra note 165, at 471-472
("Despite the frequent scatter-shot" attacks on adverse decisions mounted under the standard's
imprimatur, no commercial arbitration award has been vacated on this ground via application of
the current "degree of error" inference-based analysis.")
304. Hayford, supra note 165, at 476 et seq.
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Thus, as applicability of these two grounds is more theoretical than real-
world, it will not deprive the consumer of any practical rights if, as advocated
herein, the Supreme Court rules that there is no basis in law for recognizing
these non-statutory grounds for vacatur. At the same time, this makes clear
that even before the Supreme Court so decides, a more meaningful condition
for the validity of adhesion contracts than the applicability of what turn out to
be virtually meaningless non-statutory grounds for vacatur is needed. It is
submitted that this can be realized by requiring that the adhesion contract
provide for the consumer's right to "opt-in" for appeal to the courts, for a re-
view of the award for errors of law, and perhaps even errors of fact.
In sum, the fact that the non-statutory grounds for setting aside an arbi-
tral award provide a more theoretical3"5 than realistic chance of getting the
court to overturn an award, adds a strong argument in favor of abolishing
them. The perceived practical value of these non-statutory grounds seems to
lie only in the losing party's ability to unduly delay the inevitable execution
of the award by seeking a court's review of the award on these non-statutory
grounds. Additionally, these non-statutory grounds fail to provide a desirable
safeguard for the procedural integrity of the arbitral system.306
Once the Supreme Court (a) recognizes contractually agreed to arbitral
appeal, and (b) abolishes the non-statutory grounds, a cohesive system will
provide only for the mandatory, non-waivable, procedural safeguards set forth
in § 10(a) of the FAA and the contracting parties' freedom to include a
clause permitting full arbitral appeal to the courts. Implementing such a sys-
tem will avoid the abuses of process - such as delay of the execution of the
award currently seen when parties invoke these non-statutory grounds. It will
also avoid undesirable and unnecessary uncertainty as to whether an agree-
ment to provide for arbitral appeal is valid.
IX. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
If the United States Supreme Court were to decide to invalidate all non-
statutory grounds pursuant to which one can currently challenge an arbitral
award in the vast majority of the Circuits (and thereby confining the losing
party to a possible challenge under the non-waivable provisions of §10(a) of
the FAA), and at the same time were to recognize the contracting parties'
305. Supra notes 303-304 and accompanying text.
306. Supra notes 254-255 and accompanying text.
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freedom to choose to include in their agreement arbitral appeal to the compe-
tent district court, such a decision would not only safeguard the integrity of
the arbitral process but also give the parties the largest possible freedom in
crafting what they believe to be the most desirable arbitral proceeding to fit
the particular aspects of their contractual relationship. Such a decision would
create a welcome end to the uncertainty surrounding these two issues, and un-
doubtedly prevent much unnecessary litigation and delay tactics.
On the whole, however, when the U.S. system, as laid down in the FAA,
and the extensive case law developed since 1925 is compared with the statu-
tory laws adopted in a majority of the European countries during the last
twenty years, and in particular with the English Arbitration Act of 1996, it
becomes clear that the U.S. system is ripe for a serious overhaul. Since 1925,
the FAA has barely been amended (other than the amendments in connection
with the adoption of the New York and Panama Conventions), and its age is
beginning to show. Because it deals only with a limited number of subjects
(basically only the enforcement of arbitration agreements and confirmation,
vacation, and modification of arbitral awards), the FAA must inevitably share
the U.S. arbitration stage with federal common law and varying state laws,
leaving an unclear muddle of uncertainty and confusion, especially for the
foreign party who needs to (but probably does not like to) arbitrate in the
United States.
A number of scholars have pleaded for the adoption of a federal version
of the Model Law to resolve these problems for the purpose of international
commercial arbitration. 07 Although much can be said for adopting the Model
Law in a federal adaptation, using the English Arbitration Act of 1996 as a
model would provide an even better solution. Rather than resolving the situa-
tion just for international commercial arbitration, we need to be bold and re-
solve the issues for domestic commercial arbitration as well, as the English
Act has done so successfully. With some possible exceptions, there- appears to
be no real justification for treating domestic commercial arbitration differently
and separately from international commercial arbitration. Certain special pro-
visions are needed, as now, to legislate the interaction between the new fed-
eral arbitration act and the New York and Panama Conventions, but this has
proven not to be an obstacle. 08 If we were to embark on the perilous road of
307. See, e.g., Daniel M. Kolkey, Symposium: In Support of International Commercial Ar-
bitration and Litigation: The Need For Federal Legislation: It's Time To Adopt The UNCITRAL
Model Law On International Commercial Arbitration, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3
(1998) and Appendix A, Draft of a U.S. International Arbitration Act.
308. Compare Sections 201 through 208 of the FAA with Articles 100 through 104 of the
English Arbitration Act 1996. See also Articles 85 through 88 of the English Arbitration Act
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adopting two separate systems for domestic and international arbitration, we
would create more problems than we now seek to resolve.
The English Arbitration Act covers both domestic and international arbi-
tration, and in this and other respects, it is more complete and less of a com-
promise than the Model Law which was written and debated by delegates of
some fifty-eight countries and eighteen international organizations. 3°9 This is
not intended to take away from the enormous accomplishment the drafters of
the Model Law have achieved, nor from the stellar group of scholars who
have contributed to the enormous success of the Model Law. But the English
Act is written in plain language and codifies the common law development of
arbitration law in a manner that is both desirable and not inconsistent with ar-
bitral practice in this country.
It is pleasing to see how the English Arbitration Act begins with spelling
out the basic policy principles upon which it is based and how Schedule 1
sums up the provisions of the Act that are mandatory. The English system
also grants authority (under certain conditions) to obtain a court's opinion as
to the interpretation of a particular law, which, in view of the increasing com-
plexity of legal questions arbitrators are asked to resolve, would be worthy of
adopting in the United States all by itself.
Contrary to the provision under the English Arbitration Act for arbitral
appeal by leave of the court only on questions of law and only when certain
conditions have been met,31 0 a somewhat more open system of appeal may be
preferable for the United States. In all other respects, the English Act is well
thought out, fairly complete,31' ana accessible, and it promote efficient use of
arbitration proceedings accompanied by adequate supervision by the courts.312
This New FAA could also incorporate more clearly the relationship to
the state arbitration acts. Once a New FAA has filled the gaps that currently
exist in the federal arbitration law, an argument could be made that we no
longer need to repeat those provisions at the state level. This may well be
true for the mandatory provisions that would be set forth in the New FAA. 313
1996, dealing with specific issues relating to domestic arbitration.
309. Kolkey, supra note 307, at 14.
310. Section 69 English Arbitration Act of 1996.
311. Certain issues, however, have intentionally been left for the courts to decide. See
Chukwumerije, supra note 186, at 24.
312. William W. Park, The Interaction of Courts and Arbitrators in England, I INT'L ARB.
L. REV. 54 (1998).
313. See supra note 170.
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On the other hand, even if the far-reaching interpretation of the interstate
commerce clause in Allied-Bruce Termini 314 and Perry v. Thomas"5 were
maintained," 6 it would seem that some form of arbitration law at the state
level will be needed. Accepting that premise, it is desirable to ensure uni-
formity both between the New FAA and the state arbitration acts, as well as
among the state arbitration acts themselves. Thus, the ideal picture may well
encompass both a New FAA and a Uniform State Arbitration Act that is in
full harmony with the federal act, accompanied by a clear vision of when
federal or state law applies.
Until such a new Federal Arbitration Act is adopted, it is hoped that the
suggestions made herein will contribute in a small way to the development of
a more viable, reliable, and foreseeable system of arbitration in this country.
314. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270-72 (1995).
315. 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (holding that the FAA preempts provision of California Labor
Law which provided that actions for the collection of wages could be maintained in court with-
out regard to the existence of a private agreement to arbitrate).
316. As Jean Sternlight said, "[t]he Supreme Court, again purporting to rely on legislative
history, adopted the broadest possible definition of interstate commerce, concluding that the FAA
should be interpreted to cover the full range of Congress' authority and to regulate all 'commerce
in fact." Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Pref-
erence for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U.L.Q. 637, 665 (1996).
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